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Trusted computing base (TCB) of a computer system comprises components that
must be trusted in order to support its security policy. Research communities have
identified the well-known minimal TCB principle, namely, the TCB of a system should
be as small as possible, so that it can be thoroughly examined and verified. This
dissertation is an experiment showing how small the TCB for an isolation service is
based on software fault isolation (SFI) for small multitasking embedded systems.
The TCB achieved by this dissertation includes just the formal definitions of
isolation properties, instruction semantics, program logic, and a proof assistant,
besides hardware. There is not a compiler, an assembler, a verifier, a rewriter, or
an operating system in the TCB. To the best of my knowledge, this is the smallest
TCB that has ever been shown for guaranteeing nontrivial properties of real binary
programs on real hardware.
This is accomplished by combining SFI techniques and high-confidence formal
verification. An SFI implementation inserts dynamic checks before dangerous opera-
tions, and these checks provide necessary invariants needed by the formal verification
to prove theorems about the isolation properties of ARM binary programs. The
high-confidence assurance of the formal verification comes from two facts. First, the
verification is based on an existing realistic semantics of the ARM ISA that is indepen-
dently developed by Cambridge researchers. Second, the verification is conducted in
a higher-order proof assistant—the HOL theorem prover, which mechanically checks
every verification step by rigorous logic.
In addition, the entire verification process, including both specification generation
and verification, is automatic. To support proof automation, a novel program logic
has been designed, and an automatic reasoning framework for verifying shallow safety
properties has been developed. The program logic integrates Hoare-style reasoning
and Floyd’s inductive assertion reasoning together in a small set of definitions, which
overcomes shortcomings of Hoare logic and facilitates proof automation. All inference
rules of the logic are proven based on the instruction semantics and the logic defini-
tions. The framework leverages abstract interpretation to automatically find function
specifications required by the program logic. The results of the abstract interpretation
are used to construct the function specifications automatically, and the specifications
are proven without human interaction by utilizing intermediate theorems generated
during the abstract interpretation. All these work in concert to create the very small
TCB.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The trusted computing base (TCB) of a security-critical computer system com-
prises components of the system that must be trusted for supporting its security
policy. It includes firmware, hardware, and software critical to protection and must
be designed and implemented such that system elements excluded from it need not
be trusted to maintain protection [23]. Research communities have identified the
principle of a minimal trusted computing base: the TCB of a system should be
as small as possible, because a small TCB is often simple enough to be analyzed
and verified thoroughly, so that a high degree of assurance can be achieved in its
ability to correctly enforce the security policy [23, 92, 94]. However, the TCB of a
practical computer system is not minimal. It usually includes the operating system
and compiler which are complex software systems and are not susceptible to thorough
examination. This dissertation attempts to answer a research question: what is the
minimal TCB that can provide isolation in embedded systems? In particular I focus
on the software components of a TCB, assuming that the underlying hardware and
firmware are trustworthy.
Isolation—the guarantee that one computation on a machine cannot affect other
computations—is a fundamental system service supporting multiprogramming. Reli-
able isolation enables many useful kinds of coexistence; for example, users can safely
run code downloaded from the Internet, servers belonging to mutually-distrusting
parties can be run in different virtual machines on the same physical box, and em-
bedded systems can be made smaller and cheaper by running critical and noncritical
code on the same processor.
Isolation can be implemented in many ways, including using physical partitioning
across processors, hardware-assisted address space management, type-safety at the
2programming language level, capability-based systems, and software fault isolation
(SFI). Each method has a different TCB. The TCB of memory management unit
(MMU) based methods includes an operating system and runtime libraries. General-
purpose operating systems have long used this approach to provide isolation among
processes. Language-based methods such as type safety of the Java language add the
language runtime and standard library into the TCB. These TCBs are quite large
and very difficult to verify.
SFI enforces isolation by rewriting a binary program to insert checking code in
front of every dangerous operation [105]. An operation is dangerous if it may violate
a security policy, e.g., by writing to out-of-bounds storage or attempting to execute
unauthorized code. The inserted code checks the legitimacy of a dangerous operation
at runtime. If the operation is deemed as safe according to the policy, then the
checking code allows execution to continue without doing anything else; otherwise,
the checking code aborts the execution, leaving other computations unaffected. SFI
traditionally uses a verifier to check the presence of required logic in rewritten binary
code before the code is executed. In this implementation, the TCB of SFI includes
the verifier and a compiler; the latter generates the binary code of the verifier from
its source code.
In the context of critical embedded systems, either component may be too large
and unreliable. For example, Google’s Native Client uses an SFI implementation
to isolate untrusted binary code downloaded from the Internet in a web browser
environment [111]. However, a routine code refactoring converted the mechanism of
enforcing control flow safety to a nop on the x86 platform [78]. In addition, compiler
bugs are not uncommon, and this may result in unexpected results in the binary code
of programs [110].
This dissertation argues that placing the verifier and compiler in the TCB is
not necessary for isolation service provided through SFI. A very small TCB whose
components are formally defined and verified enables systems such as the one depicted
in Figure 1.1 to be trusted. The key property is that larger, noncritical components









Figure 1.1: Multitasking embedded systems with provable isolation
(control loops, the RTOS, etc.) using SFI.
1.1 Thesis Statement
It is feasible to verify automatically in a mechanized proof assistant that a rewritten
binary program respects its isolation policy with a minimal TCB, which includes just
the formal definitions of isolation properties, instruction semantics, program logic,
and the proof assistant.
This dissertation conducts research to support this thesis. The rest of this chap-
ter will give a high-level overview of related fields and highlights the contents and
contributions of the dissertation.
1.2 Binary Rewriting and SFI
Binary rewriting is a technique that takes a binary program generated by a
compiler, modifies it according to certain requirements, and produces another binary
program. The process may or may not be assisted with relocation information from
the compiler, and it can be implemented either statically or dynamically. The newly
generated program has enhancements which the original program does not have.
For example, the technique can be used to perform whole-program optimization at
link-time [16, 72, 101, 104]; it can also be used to enhance security characteristics of
a program, e.g., reducing certain security vulnerabilities [9, 56, 87] and safeguarding
a binary program from reverse engineering [62]; binary instrumentation uses it to
detect, monitor and measure certain behaviors of a program [58]; binary translation
applies it to generate a program that runs on a different architecture or operating
4system [19, 99]. In addition, researchers have found its applications in other areas
such as software caching [49], software transactional memory [84] and so on.
A particular application of binary rewriting is sandboxing: untrusted binary
code may execute in a confined environment inside a host software system, such
that the untrusted code cannot affect the host system except as specified by a
well-defined policy. Sandboxing implemented statically is traditionally called software
fault isolation (SFI) [28,66,105]. Sandboxing can also be implemented dynamically: a
reference monitor intercepts and translates dangerous instructions at runtime [34,38];
in this case, there is no static instrumentation of the untrusted code.
This dissertation focuses on static binary rewriting techniques to implement sand-
boxing in embedded systems. There are two fundamental research issues in SFI. The
first one is designing efficient isolation-enforcing mechanisms satisfying a security
policy such that the runtime overhead of inserted code is minimal. Existing re-
search has achieved impressive results. For example, it was reported that an average
overhead less than 5% could be achieved for certain types of sandboxing [105, 111].
The second issue is guaranteeing the security correctness of the mechanisms and
their implementation. This has not been adequately addressed. For instance, early
attempts [29, 100] to design SFI mechanisms on the x86 architecture were found to
have flaws more than a half decade later [66]. The security correctness of SFI is still
argued by code review and testing, hoping to find bugs in the source code of its veri-
fier [111]. Research efforts have been made to verify an SFI design formally [64,108].
Although these efforts are big improvements compared to informal arguments, they
are not satisfactory for important reasons. First, what they verified is designs at
the conceptual level. They assumed the correctness of a verifier or a monitor. This
means that the implementation of the most important components in a TCB is left out
completely. Second, they modeled the semantics of a small subset of an instruction
set architecture (ISA). Although it is informally arguable that a small subset may be
representative to the actual execution of a real binary program, the history of formal
verification has examples showing that using a sound and realistic semantics may
avoid unnecessary errors. I emphasize the importance of semantics in Section 1.4.1.
5This dissertation addresses the second issue of SFI by formally verifying the binary
code that runs on a physical processor.
1.3 Isolation Policy
As a security mechanism, SFI needs a security policy as a reference for its imple-
mentation. This dissertation includes two safety properties in the security policy:
memory safety : store operations are confined to predefined regions, and control
flow integrity : execution may not escape a predetermined control flow graph (CFG).
These are sufficient for isolation purposes, i.e., a computation module with these two
properties cannot affect other computations in the same address space. However, the
control flow integrity property is not a necessary condition for sandboxing, because
there exist more relaxed policies. For example, several existing SFI mechanisms
enforce a segment-based policy for control flow transfers: all jumps of a program
are limited into a continuous address segment allocated for the code of the program.
Recent studies show that such a loose policy alone allows certain types of attacks
to happen such as return-oriented programming [14, 98]. Therefore, this dissertation
adopts the strict policy for control flow transfers, and the control flow integrity stated
above disables those attacks.
The policy not only decides security features of a mechanism but also affects the
performance overhead of inserted code. For example, the loose policy mentioned above
can restrict an indirect jump with one or two additional instructions using a masking
operation, but the simple masking operation cannot enforce control flow integrity.
More complicated techniques must be used, and they result in more overhead.
Each property in the policy accepts a parameter that is defined in advance. The
memory safety property requires a set of memory regions that are allocated ahead
of time for a program to modify. These regions are normally specified by designers
and developers of embedded systems. The control flow integrity property needs a
reference CFG of the program. The CFG dictates the control flow transfers that are
allowed for every instruction of the program. It may be written down by hand or
created by a binary analysis tool.
6The security policy is external to the system that enforces and verifies the policy.
It is related to the usefulness of the system and the success of the verification. For
instance, if a policy is not correctly given with respect to the execution of a program,
e.g., the given CFG is too small, then the policy enforcing mechanism will prevent
many expected control flow transfers from taking place, resulting in a nonfunctioning
program. The corresponding verification will fail, too, because the program must
violate the CFG policy in order to execute some code branches. In contrast, if the
given CFG is larger than necessary, then a program may be able to execute more code
than desirable under this loose policy, and the verification process confirms that the
program does not violate the policy. Similar discussions also apply for the memory
safety policy. Ideally, a policy should match the expected behaviors of a program,
granting the least privilege to the program in order for it to accomplish its tasks—the
so called principle of least privilege [92, 94].
This dissertation does not discuss how the security policy is created, namely, how
the two parameters of the isolation properties are given. It makes basic assumptions
about the content of the policy and focuses on enforcing mechanisms and a formal
system that verifies the compliance of a rewritten program to the policy.
1.4 Formal Verification
Formal verification, in its general meaning, refers to using formal mathematical
models to describe software specification and implementation as well as to verify that
the implementation meets requirements of the specification. Many methods that
apply mathematical models may be included in the broad area of formal verification,
such as abstract interpretation, model checking, program modeling and synthesizing,
theorem proving etc.. This dissertation focuses on higher-order logic theorem proving:
using a mechanized proof assistant, a.k.a. a theorem prover, to verify safety properties
of binary programs automatically.
1.4.1 Theorem Proving
Since the invention of the LCF system by Robin Milner, using a mechanized
proof assistant has become the norm in theorem proving [39,69]. The basic approach
7of theorem proving is formalizing the syntax and semantics of program constructs as
logic formulas, whose basic elements are accepted as definitions in the proof assistant.
These definitions are used to derive theorems for inference rules in the logic system
supported by the assistant, and facts about a program are deduced as theorems by
using the inference rules [40, 41].
The advantages of this approach have been widely apprehended in research com-
munities. First, the reasoning process for inference rules is based on the semantics
of program constructs. This guarantees the correctness of inference rules. This is
very important, because rules defined directly might not be correct. For example,
the original assignment rule used by Hoare was not correct in terms of program
semantics [40]; one of the goals of the foundational proof-carrying code project
was to prove, based on semantics, the typing rules for typed assembly language,
which were previously defined directly in proof-carrying code [5, 6, 71, 102]. Second,
the mechanized proof assistant guarantees that a theorem can only be deduced
from existing theorems by using sound inference rules. This reduces the amount
of trusted code to basic definitions. Once the definitions are correct, the correctness
of program properties is machine-checked and guaranteed by the proof assistant.
This is in contrast with other non-theorem-proving based verification methods, such
as abstract interpretation or program synthesis [10, 86, 106]. In these methods, a
proof is implicitly embedded in the implementation of the corresponding analysis
or synthesis tools [21]. These tools are complex pieces of software, and there are
no better methods known to verify their correctness other than using a mechanized
theorem prover [89]. Because of the rigorous logic foundation and machine-checked
proof, using a mechanized theorem prover has been regarded as the most trustworthy
approach in formal verification [48,55,89].
One of the major disadvantages of using a mechanized higher-order logic proof
assistant is its manual proving process: it depends on human intelligence to apply
correct tactics, because there are no automatic decision procedures for higher-order
logic formulas. The current proof automation in such systems relies on fixed proof
steps, which might be programmed according to certain patterns [77].
81.4.2 ARM Semantics
Formal semantics plays a very important role in theorem proving. In the context
of binary programs, it interprets what individual machine instructions do, and this
echoes the semantics of a high-level language described in the traditional program
logic literature [25, 41]. The correctness of every inference rule and specification is
stripped down to and interpreted by the semantics. However, developing a sound
and realistic formal semantics is not trivial, and research efforts have been made to
build such semantics for common ISAs such as x86 and ARM [35, 37, 70, 85]. This
dissertation utilizes the existing ARM formal semantics that has been independently
developed by Cambridge researchers [37].
Originally, this ARM semantics is modeled as an operational semantics in the
HOL theorem prover. Fox verified that the semantics was correctly implemented by
a particular ARM chip [35]. Based on the operational semantics, Myreen developed
an axiomatic semantics for the ARM ISA [75]. The axiomatic semantics is formally
proven from the operational semantics in the HOL system and has a more concise
representation of machine states than does the original operational semantics. This
dissertation uses this axiomatic semantics in its formal verification.
1.4.3 The HOL Proof Assistant
The HOL system is a mechanized higher-order logic theorem prover [39,42]. The
core of its logic system is an implementation of typed λ-calculus [18,47]. Throughout
decades of development, many useful theories have been formalized and proven in the
system; e.g., the word or bit-vector theory can faithfully model the bounded integer
semantics of registers and memory. Several useful definition tools have been integrated
into the system, such as the inductive relation definition. The system supports both
forward rule-based proof and backward goal-directed proof. Proof steps are carried
out by applying tactics, rules, or custom-built SML programs. I used the HOL proof
assistant to conduct the formal verification work presented in this dissertation.
Inductive relation definition is very useful in my dissertation research. It defines a
new relation according to given patterns, and the new relation may be recursive [68].
9A very desirable property of this definition is that instances of the newly defined
relation can only be constructed according to the definition patterns. This technique
is used in several places. For example, a single rule may be defined in Section 4.4 to
convert an existing relation to another that uses different logic constants while keeping
the same underlying interpretation; the function judgment is defined recursively with
a Base rule and an Induction rule in Section 4.6.1.2.
1.5 ARMor Toolchain
This dissertation supports the thesis stated in Section 1.1 by presenting the theory
and practice of ARMor: the first toolchain that implements SFI and formally verifies
the isolation policies for a rewritten ARM binary program.
I designed and implemented ARMor’s SFI-enforcing mechanisms by using static
binary rewriting techniques based on the Diablo framework. Diablo is a link-time
optimizer or rewriter, and it can analyze and transform statically linked executables
to achieve better performance, smaller code size and improved security [88, 104].
I utilized its API to develop a set of binary transformations to enforce the iso-
lation properties—the memory safety and the control flow integrity discussed in
Section 1.3—on ARM executables emitted by GCC.
I verified the isolation properties of the rewritten program in the HOL proof
assistant automatically, based on the existing formal semantics of the ARM ISA
introduced in Section 1.4.2. The final result of the verification is a theorem stating
that the rewritten program does not violate the memory safety and the control flow
integrity.
1.5.1 ARMor’s Isolation Policy
As discussed in Section 1.3, creating safety policies is not the topic of this dis-
sertation, but some reference policies are needed in order to implement and verify
a security mechanism. For the purposes of this dissertation, I specify fixed memory
regions as the reference policy for the memory safety property and use the CFG that
Diablo computes as the reference CFG for the control flow integrity property.
Verifying that a program respects a CFG policy computed by some binary rewrit-
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ing tool is useful for security-critical programs, because such tool makes assumptions
about the execution of the program when it computes a CFG, and these assumptions
can be easily violated by subtle issues in source languages or in compilers. For exam-
ple, buffer overflow can cause a return address saved on the stack to be overwritten,
resulting in a control flow transfer to unauthorized code when a function returns [3,15].
This type of unexpected control flow transfer is not in the legal CFG computed by a
tool, but it can happen and be utilized by attackers. ARMor’s verification exposes a
huge amount of low-level details of a binary program to scrutiny and guarantees that
given a reference CFG policy, the program does not violate it, thus preventing any
kind of control-hijacking attack.
1.5.2 High-level Assurance
ARMor provides a high-confidence argument about isolation by defining the iso-
lation properties formally and verifying mechanically that the properties hold in the
verified binary program. ARMor’s verification is not conducted at a high level, such
as at an abstraction, source code, or even assembly level; instead, it is carried out
at the lowest level of an implementation—the binary code that runs on a physical
processor. This level of formal verification leaves an extremely small TCB, which is
subject to thorough examination.
1.5.3 Automated Proof
ARMor completes the entire verification process automatically: it not only verifies
specifications of a program automatically, but also generates the specifications auto-
matically. It achieves this level of automation for proving shallow safety properties
by using a carefully designed logic and by using abstract interpretation.
It is noteworthy that in formal verification, proof automation is considered as a
process that verifies a specification against an implementation based on semantics.
It does not include the generation of the specification, because a common idiom is
that the specification comes from user requirements, and it is not part of the proof
automation. For example, existing research in reasoning about low-level programs
verifies specifications generated manually [83, 113]. However, I take a different stand
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in reasoning about machine-code programs, because it is extremely difficult, or im-
practical, to write down correct specifications for binary programs manually.
1.5.4 Processing Steps
At a very high level, ARMor operates as follows:
1. An ARM executable is created by a compiler.
2. An extension for Diablo, which I developed, sandboxes the executable.
3. The HOL proof assistant automatically verifies that the rewritten executable
conforms to the memory safety and control flow integrity policies. This step
does not require human interaction.
Figure 1.2 depicts the processing steps of ARMor in more detail. The SFI imple-
mentation provides a rewritten binary program to the formal verification framework;
as mentioned in Section 1.5.1, it also provides the control flow information as the
reference CFG policy.
To describe the verification process roughly, Hoare-style reasoning is used to
produce judgments about code blocks, whereas the safety properties of a program are
defined as part of the instruction semantics and thus are guaranteed at every point in
the program. Next, function invariants in the form of derivation relations among the
Hoare judgments of code blocks are discovered using abstract interpretation. This
process is recursively performed for all functions in the program, starting from the

























Figure 1.2: Processing steps of ARMor
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are built based on the result of the abstract interpretation and then proven correct.
The judgment of the entry or top-level function is the final program judgment, which
ensures the safety properties in the verified program. The entire process will be
described in detail in Chapter 6.
1.5.5 Bug Finding
ARMor is not designed to find bugs, and its purpose is providing the high-level
assurance that the isolation service provided in Figure 1.1 is bug-free. A bug in
application code or in the binary rewriter or in the compiler can result in verification
failure, or is guaranteed by ARMor’s verification that it cannot affect the rest of the
system—an ARMor-level trap that stops the faulting computation. Ideally, these
bugs are discovered during predeployment testing.
1.6 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions.
1. It demonstrates that the TCB of an isolation service based on SFI may be
extremely small, including just the formal definitions of isolation properties,
instruction semantics, program logic, and a theorem prover, besides underlying
hardware. In particular, the TCB does not include an operating system, a
compiler, a rewriter, or a verifier. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
smallest TCB that has ever been shown for guaranteeing nontrivial properties
of realistic binary programs.
2. It implements an SFI strategy for small embedded systems which provides
provably reliable isolation for a computation task.
3. It designs a novel and practical program logic Lfn. This logic integrates the
ideas of rule-based Hoare style reasoning and of Floyd’s inductive assertion-style
reasoning in a single set of logic definitions. The result is that the logic does
not require complicated rule systems, that it unifies the treatment of partial
and total correctness specifications, and that it supports function-level modular
reasoning.
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4. Based on Lfn, it develops an automated framework for proving safety properties
of binary programs in a higher-order logic proof assistant. This framework uses
abstract interpretation with logic domains to discover the program specifications
automatically. A verification engine builds logic terms and completes a proof
by taking the results of the abstract interpretation and instantiating logic
parameters in program judgments. This framework is applied to automatically
verify the isolation properties of rewritten binary programs in the HOL system.
Although I take the ARM semantics as an example of utilizing existing formal
semantics in my research implementation, most of the formal verification frame-
work is architecture-neutral, because the semantics is parametrized in Lfn, and it is
straightforward to instantiate the semantic parameter with another ISA’s axiomatic
semantics.
1.7 A Motivating Example
Due to the abstract nature of topics, I use a concrete example shown in Fig-
ure 1.3(a) to illustrate the logic concepts and formalizations presented in this disser-
tation. The program has two functions: entryFun and foo; entryFun is the entry or
top-level function, and its first block calls foo. The code of each instruction is paired
with the address of the instruction to get a direct association with code assertions
in ARMor’s logic. Suppose that we verify its isolation properties as described in
Section 1.3. The security policy is given in Figure 1.3(b). Denote all writable memory
regions as a set of addresses mem, and use a function, succ, to model the reference
CFG, which returns the set of addresses where the control may go when given an
instruction address. The last lambda expression in the reference CFG, λa.{a + 4},
represents the control flow transfers within a basic block in which the value of PC
is increased by 4 at each instruction—the length of instructions of the ARM ISA is
fixed to 4 bytes in the ARM mode. Figure 1.4(a) shows the CFG policy at the basic
block level.
ARMor verifies this program against its isolation policy automatically and renders
the following proven theorem in the HOL proof assistant as its final verification result:
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<entryFun>
blk1: (0x0, 0xE3A0D441) //mov R13,#0x41000000
(0x4, 0xE3A00000) //mov R0,#0
(0x8, 0xE1A01000) //mov R1,R0
(0xC, 0xEB000000) //bl foo (branch to foo)
blk2: (0x10,0xEAFFFFFE) //b +#0 (branch to blk2)
<foo>
blk3: (0x14,0xE2411001) //sub R1,R1,#0x1
(0x18,0xE3320101) //teq R2,#0x40000000
(0x1C,0x11A0F00E) //movne PC,R14 (return not equal)
blk4: (0x20,0xE5C21000) //strb R1,[R2] (store byte)
(0x24,0xE3310000) //teq R1,#0x0 (test equal)
(0x28,0x1AFFFFF9) //bne foo (branch not equal)
blk5: (0x2C,0xe1a0f00e) //mov PC,R14 (return)
(a) Program code
Memory safety policy mem










Figure 1.3: An illustrating example
PROG SPEC SAFE INS entryFunction 0x0 pred bspec (1.1)
where entryFunction is a set of nodes of the entryFun function, which includes
two nodes for basic blocks—blk1 and blk2—and one node for the abstraction of
the foo function. Figure 1.4(b) depicts these nodes and the control flow transfer
relation among them. The term 0x0 is the entry address of the top-level function.
The term pred models the given CFG at the node level in terms of the predecessor
relation: it takes a node and returns its predecessor nodes. The last term bspec is the












Figure 1.4: Program CFG
the node. The SAFE INS relation encodes the isolation properties at every instruction
of the program. In plain English, Theorem (1.1) states that for every instruction of
the program in Figure 1.3(a), it respects, or does not violate, the memory safety and
control flow integrity policies given in Figure 1.3(b). This dissertation will explain
how to reach the theorem from the given program with respect to its isolation policy.
In the verification framework, the only architecture-dependent element is the
SAFE INS relation, which formally defines the safety properties of interest in semantics—
the isolation properties in this example. For different safety properties, the same
framework can be reused by defining a new relation. All other logic definitions and
proven rules stay unchanged.
CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses related work in SFI and theorem proving. Additional
discussion will follow in later chapters.
2.1 SFI
There have been many SFI designs and implementations since the pioneering
work of Wahbe et al. [105]. This subsection introduces these techniques and their
achievements as well as lessons learned by reviewing its development.
2.1.1 Original SFI
Wahbe et al. pioneered SFI techniques in the early 1990s to enhance the per-
formance of communication-intensive computation modules, because the techniques
place different modules in the same address space to reduce the cross-domain com-
munication overhead [105]. They identified that indirect jumps and indirect stores
are unsafe and must be confined. A verifier is deployed to check the validity of
safeguarding dangerous operations before a module is executed, and this becomes
standard practice in later SFI implementations. They identified two approaches to
implementing SFI: (1) modifying a compiler back end such that the compiler directly
emits the necessary sandboxing instructions for unsafe operations; (2) using binary
rewriting to modify object code without changing a compiler. They implemented the
first approach by modifying GCC for two reasons. First, leveraging a compiler makes
it possible to directly utilize the optimizations that the compiler has to reduce the
runtime overhead of sandboxing code. Second, binary rewriting, which they called
binary patching, was not considered a mature technique at that time.
The goal of SFI is to confine an untrusted binary component inside its own
segments: all indirect jumps go into a code segment, and all indirect stores access a
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data segment. A segment is a contiguous memory space whose addresses have the
same high-order bits, and these bits form the identifier of the segment. A dedicated
register is used for all indirect stores: a store address with its high-order bits cleared
is moved to the dedicated register, the high-order bits of the register are set to
the identifier of the data segment, and the dedicated register is used for a store
instruction. The segment identifier is also held in another dedicated register. Because
the dedicated registers are reserved by the compiler, they can only be used by the
sandboxing code. A similar strategy is used to confine indirect jumps. The entire
sandboxing mechanism uses five dedicated registers: an additional register is used to
hold the segment mask used to clear the high-order bits of an address.
In MIPS and Alpha machines, they achieved an average overhead lower than
5% for sandboxing store and jump instructions. The overhead for sandboxing load,
store and jump instructions is around 18%–22%. They applied some optimizations
to reduce the overhead, such as using a protection buffer surrounding segments and
avoiding sandboxing certain addresses accessed through the stack pointer, besides
applying some of the optimizations built in the compiler. The average overhead of
reserving 5 registers out of 32 in MIPS machines is negligible: only 0.4%.
Unfortunately, they did not argue the correctness of their scheme and implemen-
tation formally.
2.1.2 SFI with Formal Verification
The above SFI mechanism works well for register-rich RISC architectures, but
it becomes impractical on the x86 CISC architecture, because the latter has scarce
general-purpose registers and variable-length instructions. Research efforts were made
to develop SFI mechanisms for the x86 architecture in the late 1990s [29, 100], but
later the designs were found flawed in their assumptions [66]. A lesson from those
flawed mechanisms is that research communities begin to use formal methods to verify
the security guarantee provided by a SFI design.
Abadi et al. advocated control flow integrity (CFI), which dictates that the execu-
tion of a program must follow a path that a reference CFG determines in advance [1].
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They enforced CFI using a carefully designed technique: it inserts a unique identifier
before a potential indirect jump target and checks the existence of the identifier before
a corresponding jump instruction. The unique identifier does not exist anywhere in
the code section, and the checking code uses a mangled version of the identifier to
prevent the checking code itself from becoming a valid jump target. The overhead of
enforcing the CFI ranges from 0% to 45% with an average of 16%.
In order to guarantee the correctness of their design, Abadi et al. applied for-
mal methods to prove that the CFI design guarantees the enclosure of control flow
transfers, based on semantics of a small instruction set that they developed [2]. The
formal verification is conducted with pen and paper and checked by humans, and this
means that the proof conductor must not make any mistakes in his or her reasoning.
In addition, any implementation at the source and the object code level must be
trusted, because the verification is only at the language level.
The security policy that CFI guarantees is much stronger than the segment-based
confinement policy used in the original SFI, where control flow transfers are only
limited into a specified code segment with no reference to a CFG. In principle,
the strong policy may prevent any control-hijacking attack such as traditional stack
overflow attack [3,15] and newer return-oriented programming (ROP) attack [14,98],
because it prevents any control flow transfers that are not explicitly given in the
reference CFG from being made.
Erlingsson et al. extended the CFI work into XFI: a fully fledged software-based
access control system for executing untrusted binary modules [28]. XFI not only
enforces control flow integrity but also controls memory accesses at any granularity
with explicitly granted read, write and execute privileges. For indirect memory
accesses, it uses a guard which checks the range of addresses accessed. A fast path can
check the addresses in a single region; accesses to other regions are checked by using
a slow path. XFI also uses a trusted verifier that statically examines the presence of
checking code for memory accesses and control flow transfers. Unfortunately, it did
not extend the formal methods used by CFI. XFI overhead varies significantly, e.g.,
the code size increase is 1.3–3.9 times, and the performance slowdown is 5%–93%
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when using slow paths.
McCamant et al. designed another completely different approach to implementing
SFI on the x86 architecture [66]. This approach divides the code section of a module
into fixed-size chunks of 16 or 32 bytes. A legal jump target must start a new chunk,
and no instructions may cross a chunk boundary. This is made possible by padding
chunks with the nop instruction. Both dangerous instructions and their sandboxing
instructions must be placed inside one chunk, so that they are executed as an atomic
unit. This design makes it enough to reserve one register for holding the address of
indirect stores and jumps. They also developed optimizations to reduce the overhead
of sandboxing code, besides using some of the strategies of Wahbe et al.. For example,
a segment starting at address zero is reserved, so that address masking can be done
in one instruction instead of two. The runtime slowdown is about 21% on average,
and the code size increase is about 62%–96%.
In order to argue the security properties of their design, McCamant used the ACL2
first-order logic proof assistant to verify it [64]. He formalized the constraints of the
verifier and simulated a small subset of the x86 ISA; he proved that if code passed
the verifier check, then it was confined properly.
Winwood et al. designed a sandboxing system to enforce control flow integrity
by using lightweight binary rewriting and reference monitors, assisted by hardware-
based memory projection mechanisms of the Alpha architecture [108]. The rewriting
replaces every indirect jump with a direct jump to a jump monitor, which in turn
jumps to a security monitor to check the validity of the jump against a given security
policy. Both monitors are trusted, and a verifier is used to check that there are
no indirect jumps and system calls in a rewritten program. In order to show that
this design correctly enforces the control flow integrity, they used the Isabelle/HOL
higher-order logic proof assistant to verify the safety guarantee of their design. They
formalized the semantics of a small subset of the Alpha ISA and the semantics of the
protection mechanisms; based on the semantics, they formally verified the security of
their approach.
A common characteristic of these SFI formal verifications is that they prove the
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security of a scheme at an abstracted language level. For example, if a scheme uses
a security monitor or a verifier, the verification simply assumes the correctness of
the monitor or the verifier and gives its semantics [64, 108]. Whether the model is
faithful to its implementation is not addressed at all. However, it has been well known
that modeling is one of the weakest links that can easily go silently wrong in formal
verification [55]. A second common characteristic is that they all apply a self-defined
formal semantics of a small subset of some ISA. Section 1.4.1 has already emphasized
the importance of a realistic and faithful semantics.
2.1.3 Google Native Client
The Native Client project adopts McCamant’s instruction bundling and padding
approach to SFI with the addition of springboard techniques to confine system calls [4,
95, 111]. In modern architectures such as x86, x86-64, and ARM, it achieves an
impressive average overhead less than 5%. Code review and testing are used to find
bugs in verifier source code, and no formal methods are conducted to guarantee the
correctness of the design and implementation.
2.2 Program Logic for Machine Code
Reasoning about programs formally dates back to McCarthy, Floyd and Hoare in
1960s, where either annotated flowcharts or formulas were used to describe program
states mathematically [33, 46, 67]. This subsection reviews important development
closely related to theorem proving on machine code programs.
2.2.1 Hoare-style Logic
Hoare’s work was particularly influential in formal verification, because he showed
an axiomatic program logic in which mathematical statements of a program could
be systematically composed from predefined rules for individual statements in a
language [46]. Since the invention of the LCF system by Robin Milner [69], a
mechanized proof assistant has become a standard tool for conducting Hoare logic
reasoning [40]. The basic principle of the reasoning process is the following: a logic
judgment specifies a piece of code in the format of a triple: {P} C {Q}, where
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P and Q are the precondition and postcondition of code C. It states that if the
precondition P is true before the execution of C, then the postcondition Q is true
when C terminates. The triple of a program is developed by applying inference rules
to individual triples of the constructs of the program, and this process may be viewed
as construction of a proof tree in a bottom-up fashion. Traditional inference rules
include Sequencing, Strengthen, Weaken and so on [25].
The early Hoare logic is designed to reason about programs written in high-level
languages which have well-defined constructs. One of its characteristics is that its
inference rules must be developed based on the structures of the constructs. This
often results in a complicated rule system. For example, in order to reason about
the while loop, the logic requires proving a rule for the while structure [25]; in
order to reason about function calls, the logic needs rules proven for them [93]. When
research communities find interests in dealing with low-level language or machine-code
programs, they have adopted the basic form of Hoare logic to different variations.
Myreen et al. developed a Hoare logic for machine code, which is very similar
to the traditional Hoare logic, i.e., a complex rule system needs to be developed in
order to deal with machine-level jumps [75,76]. In order to address the reusability of
proofs, Myreen et al. developed a decompiler approach to reasoning about machine
code [77]. It converts machine-code programs into logic functions inside the HOL
proof assistant. As a result, reasoning about programs becomes reasoning about
functions in the theorem prover, and the latter is much easier and more efficient.
Once programs written in different ISAs are decompiled into the logic system of
HOL, proofs about functions can be reused. Based on this method, Myreen verified
implementations of the Cheney garbage collector written in x86, ARM and PowerPC
assembly languages, respectively [17, 73]. Furthermore, based on his machine-code
Hoare logic, he successfully demonstrated a proven just-in-time compiler for x86 [74].
However, using a Hoare logic to reason about low-level or machine-code programs
has some fundamental limitations. For example, a low-level language does not have
structured constructs. The most common type of control flow transfers is unstruc-
tured or arbitrary jumps. The Hoare logic simply cannot handle them effectively.
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To address this problem, Tan and Appel developed a compositional logic to reason
about arbitrary control flow transfers in low-level code [103]. The logic uses the
concept of label continuation, which is a pair of a program address—the label—and a
state predicate. They interpreted the pair in a continuation style: a true predicate at
a label means that it is safe to jump to that location. This interpretation allows them
to reason about any types of jumps commonly seen in low-level language programs.
However, in order to prove the soundness of the logic, they had to create a complex
semantics, which in turn resulted in a complicated soundness proof. Using this logic,
Tan not only proved the typing rules used in the typed assembly language for the
foundational proof-carrying code project, but also proved a memory safety property
in SPARC assembly code by encoding the safety property into the type system [102].
Benton proposed a typed, compositional logic for a stack-based abstract machine
and established the soundness by adopting Tan and Appel’s interpretation [8]. Saabas
and Uustalu developed a natural semantics for an unstructured low-level language and
showed that Hoare inference rules may be derived from this semantics [91].
2.2.2 Certified Assembly Programming
Inspired by proof-carrying code which mainly focuses on verification of type safety,
Shao’s group developed certified assembly programming (CAP) techniques to reason
about the functional correctness of low-level programs [113]. The basic approach
starts with a given specification, which consists of a collection of state predicates at
different program locations. The process interprets each instruction of the program,
comes up with intermediate assertions, and checks that the given specification is
consistent against the semantics of instructions. This is very similar to Floyd’s
inductive assertion, which is also used by proof-carrying code and VCG-based ap-
proaches [79, 109]. CAP’s contribution is formalizing this idea in a mechanized
theorem prover and showing that it is possible to use it to reason about the functional
correctness of low-level programs. In a later development, Shao’s group extended
CAP to a family of techniques which include modular reasoning [82,83], stack-based
control reasoning [31], concurrent program reasoning [114], and hardware interrupt
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reasoning [30].
Compared to Hoare-style reasoning, the CAP family of techniques has a simpler
structure and does not require complicated rule systems. Additionally, it does not
depend on the termination of code, because its soundness is interpreted by induction
on execution steps [113].
The disadvantage of CAP is that the reasoning process is interactive, requiring
much manual work. In addition, it is posterior in the sense that when given a correct
specification, it can verify its correctness. However, writing a correct specification
for machine-code programs requires much more effort than verifying it, which is the
rationale of proof-carrying code to separate the proof generation process from the
proof verification process, so that a code user only needs to verify a proof [79]. It
has not been shown that there exist effective ways to give correct specifications for
low-level or machine-code programs.
2.2.3 Other Work
Boyer and Yu made the first attempt to verify real-world executables generated
by GCC. They used the Boyer-Moore theorem prover Nqthm to prove the functional
correctness of a series of small machine-code programs for the Motorola MC68020
microprocessor [13, 52]. Their proof is lengthy and labor intensive.
2.2.3.1 Verification Condition Generation
Dijkstra introduced the concept of the weakest preconditions in 1970s [24,25], and
the computation of the weakest preconditions lays a solid foundation for verification
condition generation (VCG) [27, 53]. VCG verifies a program by generating a set
of mathematical predicates about program variables at certain locations—so called
verification conditions; if these verification conditions can be proven, then the original
program is implied to be correct. This method has been studied extensively in the
literature [20, 32, 48, 54, 59]. In practice, VCG has a large TCB, because it normally
requires a custom-built verification condition generator, which is a large piece of
software. The proof or discharge of verification conditions is usually conducted in a
solver or theorem prover [109].
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Matthews et al. proposed using a theorem prover to generate verification condi-
tions based on an operational semantics of a machine language [63]. Hardin used this
method to verify Rockwell Collins AAMP7G machine code [45], and the microcode
of AAMP7 is formally verified [43].
2.2.3.2 Proof-carrying Code
Necula introduced the concept of proof-carrying code (PCC) in which proofs of
certain properties of code can be attached into the code, so that a code user can
easily verify that the code adheres to certain security policies [79, 80]. Its predomi-
nant application is verifying type safety of assembly code, which was advocated by
Morrisett et al. [71]. A program is annotated with types according to typing rules
during compilation, and a well-typed program implies that certain safety properties
hold. The typing rules are defined directly in the PCC system. Tan proved the typing
rules in the foundational PCC project based on instruction semantics [102].
Leroy showed that a PCC system assumes the existence of a certifying compiler
which creates proofs that a code user can verify, or hints from which proofs can
be constructed easily; in theory, a certifying compiler implies a certified compiler,
and vice versa [60]. This means that a PCC system must implement some theorem
proving work equivalent to that of a certified compiler, revealing the biggest obstacle
of developing a practical PCC system: generating proofs, not verifying them. Leroy et
al. successfully demonstrated that utilizing a mechanized proof assistant is a practical
way to construct a certified compiler [11, 60].
2.2.3.3 Decompilation into Logic Functions
Li developed a decompilation strategy using the idea of state monads in his
validated compilation work [61]. This method can convert very messy machine code
with arbitrary jumps into a logic function, without requiring certain structures of the
code to be discovered, which is a prerequisite in the previous decompilation method
discussed in Section 2.2.1. Compared with the existing theorem proving methods
discussed above, this approach is more promising, because it converts reasoning
about arbitrary machine code into reasoning about functions in the logic system
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of a mechanized proof assistant with no presumed structures on the machine code.
The next challenge is to automate the reasoning process for logic functions, and there
is much work ahead in this direction.
2.3 Summary
It can be seen from the development of SFI that existing work lacks rigorous verifi-
cation, and this results in a large TCB in implementations; the TCB includes verifier
source code and the compiler that translates the source code into the executable
machine code. In parallel, theorem proving for verifying machine-code programs has
been studied, but remains to be shown as a practical method to verify safety properties
of binary programs. This dissertation shows that with properly developed verification
tools, SFI implementation may achieve a very small TCB for embedded systems.
CHAPTER 3
THE ARMOR SFI IMPLEMENTATION
As discussed in Section 1.5.2, the high-confidence assurance that ARMor provides
is due to formal verification using the HOL proof assistant. Verification is a static
reasoning process in HOL. It is well known that statically determining the truth of
a safety property is undecidable in general. Therefore, I implemented some binary
transformations based on Diablo, and they add necessary safety checks to a program,
making verifying isolation properties possible. The work presented in this chapter
forms the processing step marked as “SFI transform” in Figure 1.2.
3.1 Motivation
This subsection uses concrete examples to show the necessity of inserting dynamic
checking code and the invariants that the check provides.
3.1.1 Dangerous Indirect Stores
Suppose that we have a shorter binary program than the one shown in Fig-
ure 1.3(a), where the foo function does not have blk3. Recall that one of our goals is to
verify memory safety, which requires showing that the store instruction strb R1,[R2]
is safe, i.e., the address in the R2 register is in the region represented by the mem set
given in Figure 1.3(b). Because register R2 is uninitialized in this program, its value
can be any 32-bit pattern. The attempt to show that it is in the set of mem fails
naturally.
However, when we place blk3 back into the program, we will be able to verify the
memory safety. The block tests whether the value of R2 equals 0x40000000. If it is
the expected address, then control goes to the store instruction; otherwise, control
goes back to the caller. In the first case, we have a constraint about the value of
register R2, which says that the value is 0x40000000, and now we can successfully
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prove that the value of R2 is in the mem set. In the second case, we do not need to
show that the store instruction is safe, because control does not go to the instruction.
A question is: Which indirect stores are not safe and require checking code to be
inserted before them, to provide safety constraints? The ARM ISA is a load-store
architecture, and strictly speaking, every store is indirect. However, inserting checking
code before every store instruction is not necessary, because in some situations, the
value of the target address can be determined statically in the logic system of the
proof assistant. For example, a store instruction that uses a register whose value
is previously set to a safe constant does not need additional checks. Generally
speaking, store instructions whose addresses are uninitialized, derived from user input,
or computed in a complex way need additional safeguards.
3.1.2 Dangerous Indirect Jumps
Jumps through registers or memory locations are dangerous for control flow in-
tegrity. For example, suppose there is a C program, whose source code and ARM
assembly code generated by GCC are shown in Figure 3.1. Dangerous jumps happen
in functions gee and haa. The multiword store instruction at line 7 of Figure 3.1(b)
pushes the value of the link register R14 onto the stack, and R14 holds the return
address of function gee when gee is called in main at line 19. The next three
instructions set up the frame pointer R11, allocate space for the local variable x,
and place the address of x in register R0, which is also the value of R13. The stack
frame of function gee before it calls function haa is shown in Figure 3.2(a), where
r11′ is the value of R11 before it is defined at line 8.
Throughout this dissertation, I use capital letters such as “R” and “PC” to refer
to the names of registers such as register R11 or register PC, and lower case letters
“r” and “pc” to refer to the values in the corresponding registers.
When function haa is called, the address at (r0+12) is set to 0 at line 3. Unfortu-
nately, (r0+12) is the location where the return address r14 is stored for function gee.
Figure 3.2(b) shows the same stack frame after function haa returns to gee. The last
instruction of gee at line 14 loads values at addresses (r11-4), (r11-8), and (r11-12)
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void haa(int *pi) {

































(b) Compiled ARM assembly code
























(b) Return address over-
written
Figure 3.2: Compromising control flow integrity
29
into registers PC, R13, and R11, respectively. Now PC is assigned the value 0, and
when the next instruction is executed, unpredictable behavior occurs. In embedded
systems which do not have isolation support, a hardware trap may crash the entire
system.
In order to provide isolation, these dangerous uses of addresses must be controlled
such that a faulty computation cannot affect other innocent computations.
3.2 ARMor’s SFI Mechanisms
This subsection discusses the binary transformations implemented in ARMor to
support the isolation service in embedded systems.
3.2.1 Checking Unknown Store Addresses
A basic idea of preventing dangerous store instructions from accessing unautho-
rized memory addresses is inserting checking code before the instructions whose
address can not be determined statically in the logic system. The inserted code
checks the validity of the address range of a store instruction against the address
regions given in the security policy. If the range falls within the given regions, then
the checking code allows the store instruction to execute. Otherwise, the checking
code aborts the current computation. Figure 3.3 illustrates this transformation with






(a) Original code (b) Rewritten code




(c) Pseudo-code of the checking routine dguard
Figure 3.3: Checking unknown store addresses
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of registers R6 and R7 (8 bytes in total) at addresses pointed to by register R2: [r2,
r2+8).
Constraints in embedded systems and the primary research goals of this disser-
tation shape the prototype design presented here. First, a program in an embedded
system often needs to access different memory regions. As a result, I use three
disjoint regions in the security policy: the global data section, the stack, and the
I/O addresses. Although this choice bring flexibility in memory access, it impacts
performance adversely. For example, the checking routine dguard in Figure 3.3(c)
needs to compare an address range with three different regions, and this is a very
expensive operation. Second, one of the major research goals of this dissertation is
to explore the influence of a complex checking routine on formal verification. If it is
effective to reason about complicated checking routines formally, then it is relatively
easy to adopt the formal method to reason about simple routines. Third, embedded
systems usually have very limited memory. This leads to a fine-grained memory
control policy. Specifically, the memory regions are specified at arbitrary address
boundaries, and the boundaries do not have to be a power of two. In addition, there
are no protection buffers around data regions. Otherwise, limited memory in an
embedded system would become tighter. Nor is the dguard function inlined, because
the function body is not short—it has 18 instructions. Inlining would increase the
code size of a rewritten program too much.
Given a different system configuration which does not have the above memory
limitations, a completely different design choice may be used. For example, masking
operations are a natural selection to boost performance for coarse-grained segment-
based memory policy in a memory rich system, as discussed in Section 1.2. I will
discuss alternative options in detail in Section 3.3.
3.2.1.1 Checking Conditional Store Instructions
The ARM ISA has a distinctive feature of allowing almost every instruction to
execute conditionally [7]. There is a condition field in the instruction encoding, and
the value of the field indicates one of the 14 available conditions such as equality test
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results. A conditional instruction is indicated by conditional code in assembly. For
instance, the “eq” suffix in Figure 3.4 is the conditional code for an equality test. If
the status flags of the processor indicate that the corresponding condition is true when
the instruction starts executing, then the instruction executes normally. Otherwise,
the instruction does nothing, just like a nop instruction.
Conditional store instructions make the above checking scheme fail, because the
status flags may be changed by the address checking routine. In order to keep the
correct status flags for a conditional store instruction, the original flags must be
preserved before and restored after the checking routine executes. In addition, the
instructions that call the checking function must be made conditional, in order to keep
the original semantics of the program. It is not straightforward to make all the flag
operations correct, and a simple method is designed to convert a conditional store to
its unconditional version while keeping the same semantics of the original code. The
method splits the basic block containing a conditional store instruction into two at
the location right after the store instruction, makes a unconditional copy of the store
instruction in a new empty basic block, and replaces the conditional store instruction
with a conditional branch instruction which jumps to the new block and has the
same condition code as the original store instruction. The new block unconditionally
jumps back to the instruction right after the splitting point. Afterwards, the checking







str   r3, [r0]
b     0xb0xb




add r1, r0, #0x4
bl    dguard
str   r3, [r0]





Figure 3.4: Safeguarding a conditional store instruction
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Figure 3.4 shows this special transformation, where solid lines represent basic blocks,
dashed lines are inside basic blocks, and arrows are control flow transfers.
3.2.2 Protecting Return Addresses
Section 3.1.2 illustrated the danger of overwriting a return address stored on
the stack. There are several possible solutions to this issue. For example, one can
remember the location where the return address is saved and check if any store address
range includes that location. Because there are many return addresses spilled on
the stack, all of them must be checked separately. This would slow down pointer
operations too much. In typed high-level or assembly languages, a type can be defined
to prevent out-of-bound memory accesses [5,71], but there is no such type information
at the machine-code level. Dynamic binary instrumentation records a shadow value
for every memory address, which can dynamically determine out-of-bound memory
accesses [81]. This requires a huge amount of memory that small embedded systems
do not have.
There is another method: separating control from data. Return addresses are
control information related to the CFG of a program, which the program should
never directly modify for the sake of control flow integrity, while the stack contains
local variables which the program must be able to modify. I separate the control
information from the stack data by introducing another fixed memory region, as
shown in Figure 3.5. It is called the control stack : it is used to save return addresses.
When a function is called, this transformation saves a copy of the return address onto










Figure 3.5: Control stack. Left: the original memory layout of an executable. Right:
ARMor’s transformed layout.
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the address taken from the control stack. GCC is patched to reserve a dedicated
register, R8, as the control stack pointer. The original stack is not changed and is
now called the data stack. This transformation leaves the data stack as it is, allowing
out-of-bound memory accesses on it. However, because no control information is used
from the data stack, the integrity of function returns is maintained.
An issue this transformation introduces is whether the store instruction that
pushes a return address onto the control stack needs to be sandboxed, because it is an
indirect store. ARMor’s formal verification showed that for nonrecursive functions,
no checking code is needed, and the verification may prove the memory safety of the
control stack pointer without additional constraints.
The space overhead of the control stack is low, because each function call takes
an additional four bytes. The total space cost is four times the maximum depth of
nested function calls. Another overhead is the reservation of the control stack pointer.
Previous research shows that performance slowdown of reserving 5 registers out of
32 is negligible [105]. Even in the register-scarce x86 architecture, reserving a single
register does not incur obvious overhead [28]. The ARM architecture has 15 registers;
the influence of reserving one register should also be negligible, judging from these
existing results.
3.2.3 Constraining Indirect Jumps
Besides function returns, other types of indirect jumps are jump tables and func-
tion pointers. I enforce the integrity of these indirect control flow transfers by a
different method, since they do not have the stack-based control characteristics in a
binary program.
The technique is adopted from the work of Abadi et al. [1] and illustrated in
Figure 3.6. This transformation inserts a unique identifier that is not present in
the code of a program before each potential jump target. In the example, the unique
identifier for the target is 0x8. Before a corresponding jumping instruction, additional
code is inserted to check the presence of the identifier, as shown in Figure 3.6(b).
The checking method is the following: a fixed operation is used to restore the
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mov PC, R2 ;indirect jump
...
target:
str R1, [R0] ;target
(a) Original code
mov R0, 0x10 ;load mangled word pattern
mov R0, R0, ROR #1 ;right rotate 1 bit
ldr R1, [R2, #-4] ;R1 <- Mem[R2 - 4]
cmp R0, R1 ;compare ids
bne invalid ;abort if not equal
mov PC, R2 ;indirect jump
...
0x8 ;unique word pattern
target:
str R1, [R0] ;target
(b) A unique ID and the check for its presence
Figure 3.6: Constraining unknown jumps
unique identifier from a mangled value of the identifier. A correct restoration of
the unique identifier implies a valid target, and an incorrect restored value implies
that the jump target is illegal, because a modified jump target is not proceeded by
the unique identifier. The fixed operation used here is right rotation by one, and the
corresponding mangled value is left rotation by one. A mangled value of the unique
identifier is used to maintain the uniqueness of the target such that the checking code
itself does not become a valid jump target.
In the ARM architecture, a unique identifier can be placed in a data pool. A data
pool is addresses in the code section storing constant data [7].
Care must be taken when inserting a unique identifier before the jump target
that has an incoming fall-through edge, because when an identifier is inserted before
that target, the fall-through execution may cause an instruction decoding error. A
solution is inserting a new basic block with a branch instruction that jumps to the
target and treating the branch instruction as the jump target, so that the fall-through













Figure 3.7: Constraining a jump table with a fall-through edge
jump table with a fall-through edge, where dashed arrows represent indirect jumps,
and solid arrows are direct jumps.
3.3 Discussion of Related Work
Section 1.2 introduced the two central issues in SFI implementation: efficiency
and correctness. The efficiency issue is closely related to the security policy that an
SFI mechanism enforces: the less strict the policy, the less overhead the mechanism
incurs.
For memory safety, there are two extreme policies: segment-based policy and
fine-grained policy. Segment-based policy only requires all store instructions to ac-
cess a single contiguous memory region, this is enforced in the original SFI [105],
PittsField [65], and Native Client [95]. The corresponding enforcement mechanisms
can be implemented by masking store addresses: setting the high-order bits of an
address to the specified segment. This is very efficient, because masking can be
done in two instructions. To further reduce overhead, the addresses below the data
segment can be reserved empty such that the masking can be done in one instruction.
In contrast, a fine-grained memory policy can specify a memory region at any location
with certain privileges, and a program may have multiple regions each with different
privileges. A representative implementation supporting this policy is XFI [28].
ARMor’s memory safety policy is in between these two extreme cases. It allows
multiple flexibly specified regions similar to the fine-grained policy, but it does not
enforce specific read, write, or execute privileges for its isolation purpose. This policy
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is chosen due to the limitations of memory in embedded systems and its research
goals stated in Section 3.2.1.
A similar situation exists for control flow transfer policies. A very loose policy may
only require that all jumps are sandboxed to a single contiguous code region, and this
is enforced in the original SFI [105]. A slightly stricter policy may demand that jump
targets are only at fixed locations in the code section, such as the one implemented
in PittsField [65], which divides the code section into fixed-size chunks, and jumps
can only target at the start of chunks. In fact, this is necessary to guarantee that
address masking code cannot be skipped over store instructions. The strictest policy
demands that any jump must follow a path in a given CFG determined in advance.
This is enforced by CFI and XFI [1, 28]. I also used this strictest policy for the
control flow integrity in ARMor, because only this policy prevents the return-oriented
programming attacks [14, 98]. Other policies need additional mechanisms to prevent
such attacks, such as trampoline/springboard techniques or limiting addressing modes
and pointer uses [95].
Erlingsson et al. used two stacks for each untrusted module in XFI: a scoped stack
and an allocation stack [28]. The scoped stack stores function return addresses and
local variables, and it can only be accessed through a fixed offset from its stack pointer.
Because of this invariant, checks for several memory accesses may be optimized into
a single check. The allocation stack stores values accessed through pointers. Both
stack pointers are checked to maintain their validity before they are set to new values.
Inspired by XFI, I introduced the control stack in ARMor. At the machine-code
level where ARMor operates, there is no reliable way to distinguish local variables
whose addresses are taken from those whose addresses are not taken. Therefore, the
control stack only stores return addresses. In addition, no checks are needed for the
control stack pointer for nonrecursive function calls due to the formal verification of
ARMor.
The correctness issue of SFI design and implementation has not been sufficiently
addressed as mentioned in Section 1.2. I postpone its discussion to Section 8.1 after
presenting ARMor’s verification.
CHAPTER 4
Lfn: A PROGRAM LOGIC
The theoretical foundation of ARMor’s formal verification is Lfn: a novel program
logic that facilitates proof automation. I developed this logic to address limitations
of Hoare logic and the interactive nature of higher-order logic theorem proving in
verifying shallow safety properties.
4.1 Motivation
A program logic plays a central role in reasoning about programs in a mechanized
theorem prover.1 Section 2.2.1 introduced the Hoare logic and its adoption in reason-
ing about binary programs. However, there are fundamental limitations in Hoare-style
logics that make them unsuitable for low-level or machine-code programs. First, a
Hoare logic is structured according to the constructs of a language. Each structure
requires certain rules to be proven in the logic in order to compose a code judgment
for that construct, e.g., one of the most famous structures and its rule are the while
loop and the While rule [25, 41]. However, machine-code programs do not naturally
have such structures. As a result, although a Hoare logic may be developed for
reasoning about binary programs, it can only deal with certain code whose structures
are obvious such as function calls or whose structures can be heuristically rebuilt such
as simple loops [76, 77]. For most arbitrary jumps commonly seen in machine-code
programs, it is extremely difficult to develop rules for them. For example, there are
no standard rules for jumps such as those shown in Figure 4.1.
1By convention, when a program logic is developed inside the logic system of a proof assistant,
the latter is called metalogic to distinguish the target logic from the existing logic environment of
the proof assistant. In my case, Lfn is the target logic, and the logic system of HOL is the metalogic.
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Figure 4.1: Unstructured jumps
Second, a Hoare logic is unable to reason about infinite loops. There are total
and partial specifications in a Hoare logic [25,93]. The total specification states that
if the precondition is true and the code terminates, then the postcondition is true.
The partial specification does not require the termination condition. However, in
practice, either specification is not helpful in reasoning about infinite loops, because
the postconditions of the loops cannot be verified. In embedded systems, many control
loops are purposely written to iterate forever.
Third, a Hoare logic only specifies the precondition and postcondition of code,
and this means that only the prestate and poststate are asserted in the specification.
Intermediate states are completely suppressed in a Hoare judgment. This is a problem
for verifying safety properties, because safety verification requires that every state of
a program should be validated. For example, assume that a piece of code accesses
illegal memory locations but later on restores their values. One may use a Hoare logic
to show that the ending state of the code stays the same as the starting state and to
argue that no security violations occur.
As an alternative to Hoare-style reasoning, Section 2.2.2 introduced certified as-
sembly programming. There are also fundamental issues that hamper its practicality.
First, how to efficiently write correct specifications for low-level or binary programs?
Manually working on assembly code is very inefficient and error-prone, and there are
no good methods to address this issue. Second, the proof is interactive. Depending on
experts to conduct proofs at machine-code level is just noneffective. In order to prove
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safety properties, this method requires interactive verification at each instruction.
Lfn is designed to address the issues that a Hoare logic has. Based on it, I
developed proof automation strategies for verifying shallow safety properties in a
higher-order logic proof assistant. This chapter describes the logic, and Chapter 6
presents proof automation.
4.2 Overview
Lfn has three layers: the bottom layer is a parametric instruction semantics, the
middle layer is a Hoare logic, and the top layer is a hierarchical function judgment.
The parametric instruction semantics allows the logic to use an existing axiomatic
semantics flexibly; it interprets the meaning of individual state transitions at the
instruction level. The Hoare logic reasons about code blocks. A code block is a
collection of instructions that has a single entry and one or more exits. The result of
reasoning at this layer is Hoare judgments of code blocks. The hierarchical function
judgment is the core of Lfn, and it defines the meaning of a program. A function is
a collection of code blocks, which has a single entry block and multiple exit blocks.
It may or may not correspond to a function in a high-level language, depending on
the convenience of verification. A program is a collection of functions organized as a
tree structure similar to a call graph. Each function has its own judgment, and the
judgment of the top-level or entry function is the judgment of the program.
4.3 Background: ARM Semantics
The bottom layer of Lfn is the instruction semantics. This subsection describes
the existing ARM semantics mentioned in Section 1.4.2. It comes in as proven Hoare
triples, based on a operational semantics, in the HOL theorem prover [37,75], but I use
it as if it were an axiomatic semantics, because I take it for granted. Figure 4.2 shows
the semantics for the store instruction: strb R1,[R2]. It says that after execution
of the instruction, the value at memory address r2 is updated to the least significant
byte of r1 (w2w converts a 32-bit word into an 8-bit word), and the PC is increased by
4. This semantics has some important properties which are summarized below. For
a full treatment, interested readers may refer to the references mentioned above.
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4.3.1 Code Assertion
The pair (p, 0xE5C21000) is the code assertion for the instruction, meaning that
the value 0xE5C21000 is stored at some memory address p. The value p can be
thought as symbolic, and in fact, all nonconstant values in italic font are symbolic.
In logic terminology, these symbolic values are free variables or universally quantified
variables in the theorem.
4.3.2 Machine State Assertion
Machine states include registers, memory cells, status flags, and the current
program status register. For example, PC p in the precondition of Figure 4.2 asserts
that the program counter has value p and that p is word-aligned; R 2 r2 and R 1 r1
assert that registers R2 and R1 have values r2 and r1, respectively; MEMORY dom f
asserts that some set of memory addresses dom has value f . The 7→ operator is defined
as: (a 7→ b) f = λx.( if x = a then b else f x), namely, the result is a new function
where a is mapped to b while other values stay unchanged. ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f)
means that only the value at address r2 is updated to (w2w r1). Other machine state
assertions include S t v: one of the status flags t (carry sC, negative sN, overflow sV,
or zero sZ) has value v; CPSR x: the program status register, CPSR, has value x.
4.3.3 Separating Conjunction
The ∗ operator is the separating conjunction, and it has the expected properties as
described in separation logic [90]: (1) a triple only asserts the local state, which is the
parts of state that are used by the instruction, and a global version may be achieved
by using the Frame rule, which adds resource assertions not used by a judgment onto
it; (2) if a separating conjunction expression asserts a machine resource more than
{PC p ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1 ∗ MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉}
(p, 0xE5C21000) // strb R1,[R2]
{PC (p+ 4) ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1 ∗ MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f)}
Figure 4.2: Axiomatic semantics of strb R1,[R2]
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once, excluding a pure assertion, then its value is false.
4.3.4 Pure Assertion
A pair of angled brackets, 〈〉, encloses a pure assertion, i.e., it does not assert
any machine resource but serves as a predicate to specify some boolean relationship
among logic variables and constants [75, 90]. Condition 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 states that r2
has to be in the domain of the memory function f in order for this transition to take
place.
4.3.5 Lifted Operators
Some boolean operators such as implication (⇒) and disjunction (∨) are lifted to
the separating conjunction level. For example, p
∗
=⇒ q means ∀s. (p s ⇒ q s), and
p
∗
∨ q is λs. (p s ∨ q s).
4.3.6 Conditional Execution
The semantics gives two separate theorems for an instruction with conditional
execution, with each corresponding to a different condition. For instance, the condi-
tional branch instruction ending blk4 in Figure 1.3(a), bne foo, has two theorems:
{PC (p+ 0x28) ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈¬z〉}
(0x28, 0x1AFFFFF9)
{PC (p+ 0x14) ∗ S sZ z}
{PC (p+ 0x28) ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈z〉}
(0x28, 0x1AFFFFF9) //bne foo (4.1)
{PC (p+ 0x2C) ∗ S sZ z}
where ¬ is the boolean negation. The left theorem describes the state transition when
the condition is true, i.e., not equal (ne), and the right gives the state transition when
the condition is false.
4.3.7 Additional Enhancements
I have developed additional assertions and theorems for the existing semantics
during the development of ARMor, and one of them is an aggregated register assertion
REG. An assertion REG rf means that the values of registers R0-R7 and R9-R14 are
asserted by function rf . Registers R8 and R15 are excluded, because R8 is used as
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the control stack pointer in ARMor (Section 3.2.2) and R15 is the program counter
register in the ARM ISA.
Throughout the rest of this dissertation, I will use both the aggregated register
assertion REG and the individual register assertion R depending on the convenience of
description.
4.4 Assertion Language
The assertion language in Lfn is a set of label predicates embedded shallowly in
the metalogic. Informally, a label predicate is a pair of a label (an instruction address)
and a predicate, meaning that the predicate holds at the associated label. A set of
label predicates means that there is a true label predicate in the set. Formally, the
syntax of a label predicate is
lp ∈ LabelPred = LabelExp× StateAssert
l ∈ LabelExp = word32
p ∈ StateAssert = separating conjunction expression.
Its interpretation is defined by a semantic function LP2SP, and another function,
LPSET, interprets a set of label predicates:
LP2SP (l, p) = PC l ∗ p
LPSET P = λs. (∃lp. lp ∈ P ∧ (LP2SP lp) s) .
Symbol
lp
=⇒ is used to denote the subsumption relation between two sets of label
predicates and defined as:
P
lp
=⇒ Q iff (LPSET P )
∗
=⇒ (LPSET Q).
In order to use the existing semantics in Lfn, I define the following Ins rule:
{PC l ∗ p} ins {PC l′ ∗ q}
ARM INS (l, p) ins (l′, q)
Ins.
The semantics ARM INS is defined as an inductive relation with only one rule,
Section 1.4.3. The purpose of this definition is to convert an instruction theorem into
another that uses the label predicate as the assertion language. The reason behind
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this conversion is that it is easy for the metalogic to operate on a pair, but it is
difficult to operate on the ∗ operator, because the latter is not a constructor, and the
metalogic cannot match an expression against it. Later when defining the function
judgment of Lfn, I take use of the matching ability of the metalogic on a pair.
4.5 A Hoare Logic
Hoare logic is the middle layer of Lfn, and its purpose is to reason about a code
block that only has sequential control flow transfers. I implemented it by the following
set of definitions that bridges the gap between the underlying instruction transition
and a Hoare judgment.
First, a step relation implements a state transition in the logic:
step ir i s t iff
∃lp kq. (ir lp i kq) ∧ (LP2SP lp) s ∧ (LP2SP kq) t.
Informally, it says that a transition from state s to state t by instruction i under a
given semantics ir is equivalent to a transition from s to t made by the instruction
under the semantics. The first parameter, ir, is a relation of instruction transition,
namely, an instruction semantics. It gives the logic the flexibility to use an existing
axiomatic semantics in the format of a Hoare triple. For example, it can be the
instruction semantics defined above (ARM INS), or an augmented version for proving
safety properties (to be described later in Chapter 6). For easy understanding, a
reader can simply think of it as the ARM INS relation for now. This definition is
necessary, because it allows explicit references to states such as state s in the following
definitions, instead of referring state assertions such as a label predicate lp.
Next, a sequencing relation implements the concept of n-step execution:
seq ir C sq s iff
(sq 0 = s)∧
(∀n. if ∃i ∈ C. ∃t. step ir i (sq n) t
then ∃i ∈ C. step ir i (sq n) (sq (n+ 1))
else sq (n+ 1) = sq n)
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where C is a set of instructions, and sq is a mapping from integer to state, which
numbers states sequentially starting with 0. The definition specifies that in an
instruction set, if there exists an instruction that can take a current state to the
next, then just transition the current state; otherwise, execution gets stuck on a
state.
With the above preparations, I next define a single-entry single-exit Hoare judg-
ment and extend it to a multiple-entry multiple-exit Hoare judgment. The single-
entry single-exit Hoare judgment is
sglspec ir {lp} C {kq} iff
∀r s. ((LP2SP lp) ∗ r) s⇒ ∀sq. seq ir C sq s
⇒ ∃k. ((LP2SP kq) ∗ r) (sq k).
It reads that if the precondition lp holds for an initial state s, then k steps later, the
postcondition kq holds for another state (sq k). The universally quantified r forces
any resources used by the code to be included in the pre- and postconditions.
The multiple-entry multiple-exit Hoare judgment is
SPEC ir {P} C {Q} iff sglspec ir (LPSET P ) C (LPSET Q)
where P and Q are sets of label predicates, and ir is the parametric instruction
semantics described above. It states that if there exists a true label predicate in the
precondition, then there exists a true label predicate in the postcondition some steps
later.
4.5.1 Inference Rules
From the above definitions, I proved basic inference rules about label predicates
and Hoare judgments, some of which are listed in Figure 4.3, where the leading logic
constant SPEC is omitted except for the Ins2Spec rule. The Ins2Spec rule does nothing
more than getting instruction rules in this Hoare logic. Because this Hoare logic does
not have its own built-in state transitions and relies on an existing axiomatic semantics
represented by the ir parameter, this rule simply maps a state transition encoded in
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Instruction rule:
ir {p} ins {q}























(P ∪ {(l, r)})
lp
=⇒ (P ∪ {(l, p)})
Imp2LPimp
Hoare rules:
ir {P1} C1 {Q1} ir {P2} C2 {Q2}
ir {P1 ∪ P2} (C1 ∪ C2) {Q1 ∪Q2}
Union
ir {P ∪M} C {Q ∪M} ir {M} C {Q}
ir {P ∪M} C {Q}
Discharge
ir {P} C1 {M} ir {M} C2 {Q}
ir {P} {C1 ∪ C2} {Q}
Sequence
ir {P} C {Q}
ir {(l, p ∗ r)|(l, p) ∈ P} C {(k, q ∗ r)|(k, q) ∈ Q}
Frame
ir {P} C {Q} R
lp
=⇒ P
ir {R} C {Q}
Strengthen
ir {P} C {Q} Q
lp
=⇒ R
ir {P} C {R}
Weaken
LPMerge:
ir {P ∪ {(l, p)} ∪ {(l, q)}} C {Q} = ir {P ∪ {(l, p ⊻ q)}} C {Q}
ir {P} C {Q ∪ {(l, p)} ∪ {(l, q)}} = ir {P} C {Q ∪ {(l, p ⊻ q)}}
Figure 4.3: Proven inference rules
ir to an instruction rule in the Hoare logic. The Imp2LPimp rule makes it easier to
use and derive condition subsumption relations, and the LPExt rule is very useful in
strengthening or weakening a Hoare judgment.
The Union rule composes the judgments of small pieces of code into a single
“bigger” judgment, and is used to derive other rules such as the Sequence rule.
The Discharge rule removes unnecessary intermediate label predicate entries in the
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postcondition. The Sequence rule is used to construct the judgment for basic blocks.
Weaken and Strengthen are used to change the post- and preconditions of a Hoare
judgment. The Frame rule extends a local judgment to the global version. Label
predicate merge rules are used to merge and split label predicate entries.
These rules are standard inference rules in a traditional Hoare logic and similar
to some of the rules developed in existing work [75, 103]. A major difference is that
there are no loop rules or call rules to compose loops or function calls in this logic—in
fact, there are no compositional rules for structures other than simple sequential code
blocks, because these structures are reasoned about in the top layer of the logic
without using any compositional rules.
4.5.2 Automatic Composition of Code Block Judgment
Unlike in a traditional Hoare logic, the role of this Hoare logic is very limited
in Lfn, and it is only used to compose judgments for code blocks. There are at
least two different ways to compose a code block judgment from smaller judgments
in this Hoare logic. One is using the traditional Sequence rule, and this has been
well studied [40,46]. This section describes an alternative process to illustrate how to
use some of the rules. The inferences rules used in this process are Ins2Spec, Frame,
Union, Discharge, Strengthen, and LPExt.
Let me take the code block, blk4, of Figure 1.3(a) as an example and compose its
Hoare judgments. For a complete description of the Hoare-style reasoning process,
I start with a preparation step which generates the instruction rules. This step
applies the Ins rule defined in Section 4.4 to an existing instruction axiom to obtain
a corresponding ARM INS relation. Next, the Ins2Spec rule is used on the relation
to derive the SPEC ARM INS Hoare judgment for the instruction, where the semantic
parameter ir is instantiated with ARM INS. After applying this step to the existing
semantics shown in Figure 4.2, we obtain the following Hoare rule for the same store
instruction:2
2A Hoare triple is commonly written as {P} C {Q} in literature. Here, P, C and Q are sets,
whose content is also written in braces by convention. For clarity, I only use one pair of braces in
writing pre- and postconditions and do not use braces for code.
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SPEC ARM INS {(0x20, MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1)}
(0x20, 0xE5C21000) // strb R1, [R2] (4.2)
{(0x24, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f) ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1)}
where p in Figure 4.2 is instantiated to 0x20: the address where the instruction code is
stored. Similarly, the Hoare rule for the second instruction of blk4 can be developed:
SPEC ARM INS {(0x24, R 1 r1 ∗ S sZ z}
(0x24, 0xE3310000) // teq R1, #0x0 (4.3)
{(0x28, R 1 r1 ∗ S sZ (r1 = 0))}.
Notice that the value of the sZ flag is set to (r1 = 0) in the postcondition.
For clarity, I have omitted the assertions of other status flags whose values are also
symbolic expressions. The judgments of the last instruction of the block are given
before in Judgment (4.1).
With the Hoare judgments for individual instructions, we can compose them
together to form Hoare judgments covering the block. Let us start with the first two
instructions. The first step is to match state assertions used by the two judgments
and use the Frame rule to add the assertions that are not used by a judgment to that
judgment. In this process, the free variables of the second judgment are instantiated
to the corresponding values in the postcondition of the first judgment. For example,
assertion (MEMORY dom f ∗ R 2 r2) is added to Judgment (4.3), and the assertions
of status flags are added to Judgment (4.2). The f symbolic variable in the second
judgment is instantiated to ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f), because f is free syntactically, and
semantically the second judgment starts with the ending state of the first judgment.
The second step is to apply the Union rule to merge the two rules together.
The third step is using the Discharge rule to remove the intermediate entry in the
postcondition, which is the entry with label 0x24 in this case.
The last step is to apply the LPExt and Strengthen rules to remove the interme-
diate entry from the precondition to get a Hoare judgment for the two instructions.
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Since this is a very straightforward process, I have omitted the intermediate results.
The final judgment is:
SPEC ARM INS
{(0x20, MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1 ∗ S sZ z)}
(0x20, 0xE5C21000) // strb R1, [R2]
(0x24, 0xE3310000) // teq R1, #0x0
{(0x28, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f) ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1 ∗ S sZ (r1 = 0))}
By repeating the same procedure with this judgment and the two judgments of
the last instruction in Judgment (4.1), the judgments of blk4 are developed, and the
final results are:
SPEC ARM INS
{(0x20, MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ 〈r1 6= 0〉 ∗ S sZ z ∗ a1)}
blk4 (4.4)
{(0x14, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f) ∗ S sZ (r1 = 0) ∗ a1)}
a1 = R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1
SPEC ARM INS
{(0x20, MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ 〈r1 = 0〉 ∗ S sZ z ∗ a1)}
blk4 (4.5)
{(0x2C, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f) ∗ S sZ (r1 = 0) ∗ a1)}
It is noteworthy that the composition process is mechanical and does not require
smart rule selection, so that it can be automated by metalanguage programming: the
SML programming environment of the HOL theorem prover.
4.5.2.1 Pushing up Pure Assertions
After composition, the branch condition of an instruction is “pushed up” to the
precondition of the judgment of the code block that contains the instruction, becoming
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the block’s precondition, such as the branch conditions (r1 6= 0) and (r1 = 0) in the
above example. If we merge Judgments 4.4 and 4.5 together by using the LPMerge
rules discussed in Section 4.5.1, the two branch conditions become tautologous 〈(r1 6=
0) ∨ (r1 = 0)〉 and can be removed from the precondition of the merged judgment.
The merged judgment of blk4 is shown below:
SPEC ARM INS
{(0x20, MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ S sZ z ∗ a1)}
blk4 (4.6)
{(0x14, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f) ∗ S sZ (r1 = 0) ∗ a1),
(0x2C, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f) ∗ S sZ (r1 = 0) ∗ a1)}
I want to emphasize that a safety assertion to be discussed later when proving
safety properties exhibits a similar behavior to the branch condition, namely, it is
pushed up from the precondition of an instruction to the precondition of the code
block containing the instruction, if it cannot be discharged or proven inside the code
block. What is different, though, is that a safety assertion may not have two opposite
cases to form a tautology.
4.5.3 Well-Formed Hoare Judgment
In order to model a code block which has only one entry address, I defined a well-
formed Hoare judgment as a single-entry multiple-exit Hoare judgment by imposing
two constraints: (1) there is only one entry address for the code; (2) the label of a
label predicate in the precondition must be the entry address. Formally, it is
WF SPEC ir P C Q iff
(SPEC ir {P} C {Q}) ∧ (∀(l, p) ∈ P. l = L(C))
where L(C) is an auxiliary function that returns the entry address of a code block
C, defined as L(C) = min(image fst C), where a code block is represented as a set
of labeled instructions, and the entry instruction has the lowest address. The image
function returns the range of a domain: image f s = {f x | x ∈ s}; fst returns the
first element of a tuple.
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4.6 Hierarchical Function Judgment
The central structure of Lfn is a recursive function judgment. Informally, a
function consists of code blocks and function calls. Code blocks are specified by the
well-formed Hoare judgment described above. For function calls, I abstract a callee
as a well-formed node, which behaves like a well-formed Hoare judgment in the caller.
It has a single-entry precondition, abstract code and a multiple-exit postcondition.
Now a function only has Hoare judgments, and the relationship among these Hoare
judgments is specified as the following: for every judgment, the postcondition of its
predecessors implies its precondition. If the function is called by another function,
then the former can be abstracted again to act as a single Hoare judgment in the
reasoning process about its caller. This recursive process forms a hierarchy of function
judgments until reaching the entry or top-level function of a program.
4.6.1 Formal Definitions
This subsection presents the series of concepts introduced above formally.
4.6.1.1 Implication
The implication idea mentioned above originates from Floyd’s inductive asser-
tion [33], and I define it formally in order to assign meanings to functions:
Q
P








It states that a set of label predicates Q implies another set of label predicates
R (at the function level) if and only if for every label predicate lp in R, if a label
predicate kq in Q has the same label with lp, then the singleton set of kq should
imply the singleton set of lp.
4.6.1.2 Function Judgment
I define the hierarchical function judgment formally in Figure 4.4. There are two
central definitions: Figure 4.4(a) shows the judgment of a function, and Figure 4.4(b)
defines the concept of a well-formed node. In Lfn, a function is a set of nodes with
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FUN SPEC wf ir prog entry init exits predecessor bspec kspec iff
({(entry, init)}
lp
=⇒ (bspec (bbl entry)))∧




(wf ir (bspec node) node (kspec node))∧




WF SPEC ir {(l, p)} C {Q}
WF NODE ir {(l, p)} (bbl l) {Q}
Base
FUN SPEC WF NODE ir prog entry init exits predecessor bspec kspec





PROG SPEC ir prog entryAddr predecessor bspec iff
∃kspec exits. FUN SPEC WF NODE ir prog entryAddr (λs. T)
exits predecessor bspec kspec
(c) Program judgment as the judgment of the top-level function
Figure 4.4: Hierarchical function judgment
certain constraints, and the constraints specify the entry and exit conditions as well
as the relationship among the nodes. Roughly speaking, the first two lines of the
definition in Figure 4.4(a) restrict the entry and exit conditions with respect to the
specifications of a function. The last three lines constrain the nodes of a function:
the second to the last line requires that every node of the function is well-formed,
whose definition will come later, and the last line specifies the relationship among the
nodes.
I now explain the parameters of the function judgment in Figure 4.4(a). The first
parameter of the definition, wf , is a well-formed node relation, and it refers to Hoare
judgments of code blocks or the Hoare abstractions of function calls. Figure 4.4(b)
defines such a relation. The second parameter ir is an instruction semantics, and
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prog is the set of nodes of a function. The next parameter entry is the entry address
of the function, and init is the initial condition of the function. The exits parameter
is a set of pairs of an exit node and its associated exit condition. The predecessor
parameter models the CFG policy at the node level within a function: given a node,
it returns the set of predecessor nodes. The last two parameters bspec and kspec are
specifications for all nodes of the function; the former is a mapping from nodes to
their preconditions, and the latter is a mapping from nodes to their postconditions.
The relationship among nodes specified in the last line of the definition states that
if a node is a predecessor of another node, then the postcondition of the predecessor
implies the precondition of the node. The constraints of the entry condition of a
function specify that the initial condition of the function subsumes the bspec at the
entry node, and the constraints of the exit condition stipulate that for every exit
node, its kspec subsumes the exit condition associated with that node. In a simple
case, {(entry, init)} is (bspec (bbl entry)), and (kspec e) is q.
4.6.1.3 Abstract Code
The bbl function is one of the two constructors for the data type fun node, which
represents abstracted code, i.e., a code block or a function by its entry label:
bbl,fun: word32 → fun node.
I use two constructors for human readability purposes, indicating that a node is
a code block or a function abstraction; from the perspective of a type system, one
constructor is enough.
4.6.1.4 Well-Formed Node
The concept of a well-formed node is central to the hierarchy of function judg-
ments, which is formally defined in Figure 4.4(b) with the inductive relation definition
of the metalogic. The Base rule states that the well-formed Hoare judgment of a code
block is a well-formed node. The Induction rule states that a function judgment is
also a well-formed node, given that the nodes of the function are already well-formed.
The precondition of this well-formed node is the initial condition of the function, and
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the postcondition is the union of all exit conditions of the function, represented by
operator
⋃
. The snd function returns the second element of a tuple. In the call graph
of a program, the leaf functions, which do not have a callee, only have the bbl nodes
created from applying the Base rule to its code blocks; other functions have both bbl
nodes and fun nodes, and the latter is generated by applying the Induction rule to
judgments of callees.
In the metalogic, defining the Induction rule requires monotonicity of the an-
tecedent with respect to the relation parameter [68], namely, one needs to show
FUN SPEC is monotonic with respect to its first parameter wf . Specifically, I proved





(∀ir P C Q. wf1 ir P C Q⇒ wf2 ir P C Q)⇒
(FUN SPEC wf1 ir prog entry init exits pred b k ⇒
FUN SPEC wf2 ir prog entry init exits pred b k).
With the definition shown in Figure 4.4, a function judgment is FUN SPEC WF NODE
in Lfn. Although the definitions of WF NODE are written in the natural deduction-style
without quantifying any parameters, all the parameters of the two antecedents are
universally quantified in the actual HOL logic, showing the nature of higher-orderness.
Particularly, the definition of FUN SPEC takes higher-order parameters, such as wf
which may be instantiated with WF NODE.
4.6.1.5 Program Judgment
Based on the above definitions, a program judgment simply becomes the judgment
of the top-level or entry function. Its definition is given in Figure 4.4(c), where the
initial condition is a true state predicate (λs. T).
4.6.2 An Example
I use the code example shown in Figure 1.3(a) to illustrate how the function
judgment works in reasoning about a program. Suppose that we have developed the
Hoare judgments of code blocks of the program. Denote the pre- and postconditions of

































Figure 4.5: Function judgments
CFG of the program. Further suppose that we have derived the implication relation
between adjacent pre- and postcondition pairs, namely the
P
=⇒ relation holds between
pairs (Q1, P3), (Q3, P4), (Q3, P2), (Q4, P3), (Q4, P5), (Q5, P2), and (Q2, P2).
Under these assumptions, we can prove that Hoare judgments of code blocks are
well-formed by the definition of well-formed Hoare judgment in Section 4.5.3, because
each code block indeed has only one entry address. The proven well-formed Hoare
judgments look like the following:
WF SPEC ARM INS {Pi} blki {Qi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
Next, we apply the Base rule defined in Figure 4.4(b) to the above judgments to
get well-formed nodes of code blocks:
WF NODE ARM INS {Pi} (bbl (L blki)) {Qi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
The judgment of function foo can be developed as follows. The most important
parameters in the definition of function judgment in Figure 4.4(a) are the two map-
pings bspec and kspec. The former is the mapping from nodes to their precondition,
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namely, it is the following, if I write the mapping as a list of update operations for
readability purpose:
bspec foo = [(bbl 0x14) 7→ P3, (bbl 0x20) 7→ P4, (bbl 0x2C) 7→ P5]
where the entry address of each code block is explicitly written. Similarly, kspec is
kspec foo = [(bbl 0x14) 7→ Q3, (bbl 0x20) 7→ Q4, (bbl 0x2C) 7→ Q5].
The entry address of function foo is 0x14, and its initial condition is taken as the
condition in P3, i.e., {(entry foo, init foo)} = P3 (remember that the precondition is
a singleton of label predicate). The exit condition of the function is
exits foo = {(bbl 0x14, Q3), (bbl 0x2C, Q5)},
because both blk3, whose entry address is 0x14, and blk5, whose entry address is
0x2C, are exit blocks.
The CFG parameter is the node-level predecessor relation, and it can also be
written as a mapping from a node to its predecessor nodes, namely,
predecessor foo = [(bbl 0x14) 7→ {(bbl 0x20)},
(bbl 0x20) 7→ {(bbl 0x14)},
(bbl 0x2C) 7→ {(bbl 0x20)}]
In reasoning about function foo, only its own code is considered, and its code is
represented by a set of abstract nodes:
prog foo = {(bbl 0x14), (bbl 0x20), (bbl 0x2C)}.
After constructing these terms, we can write down the judgment of function foo:
FUN SPEC WF NODE ARM INS prog foo entry foo init foo exits foo
predecessor foo bspec foo kspec foo
It is easy to prove this judgment as a theorem, after expanding the definition
of FUN SPEC. For example, for node (bbl 0x14), its predecessor’s postcondition is
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kspec foo (bbl 0x20) = Q4, which implies (
P
=⇒) the precondition of the node, which
is bspec foo (bbl 0x14) = P3, under the above assumptions.
We can now apply the Induction rule defined in Figure 4.4(b) to obtain the Hoare
abstraction of function foo, after proving the above judgment.
WF NODE ARM INS {(entry foo, init foo)} (fun 0x14)
(⋃
(image snd exits foo)
)
= WF NODE ARM INS P3 (fun 0x14) (Q3 ∪Q5).
This abstraction gives function foo a logic syntax of Hoare triple, which can be in
turn used just like a well-formed Hoare judgment of a node in reasoning about its caller
entryFun—the top-level function of the program. Let Pfoo = P3 and Qfoo = (Q3∪Q5).
Then, we get the nodes and their pre- and postconditions of function entryFun shown
in Figure 4.5(b). Repeating the same procedural for developing the function judgment
of foo, we can develop the judgment of entryFun as:
FUN SPEC WF NODE ARM INS prog f 0x0 init f exits f
pred f bspec f kspec f
where
prog f = {(bbl 0x0), (fun 0x14), (bbl 0x10)}
{(0x0, init f)} = P1
exits f = {(bbl 0x10, Q2)}
pred f = [(bbl 0x0) 7→ {},
(fun 0x14) 7→ {(bbl 0x0)},
(bbl 0x10) 7→ {(fun 0x14), (bbl 0x10)}]
bspec f = [(bbl 0x0) 7→ P1, (fun 0x14) 7→ Pfoo , (bbl 0x10) 7→ P2]
kspec f = [(bbl 0x0) 7→ Q1, (fun 0x14) 7→ Qfoo , (bbl 0x10) 7→ Q2].
Likewise, this judgment can be proven by expanding the definition of FUN SPEC
under the same assumptions.
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The program judgment naturally follows according to its definition in Figure 4.4(c),
once the above top-level function judgment is proven:
PROG SPEC ARM INS prog f 0x0 pred f bspec f. (4.7)
4.6.3 Discussion
The function presented here is a concept in logic, although it mirrors a function
at the object-code level. A function may or may not coincide with a function in the
source code language. Similarly, it may or may not correspond to a function at the
object-code level, although in practice I simply abstract an object-code level function
into a logic function due to its convenience. The object-code level functions may
be constructed by a binary analysis/rewriting tool. Such a tool can decompile an
executable, construct a conservative CFG, and build functions by using call/return
conventions, among other functionalities [50, 104].
4.6.3.1 Unstructured Control Flow Transfers
Although some inference rules are proven for the Hoare logic used in Lfn in
Section 4.5, they are only used to compose judgments for code blocks, because the
sequential structure of code blocks is simple enough that the composition process can
be automated. Unstructured control flow transfers are reasoned about in the hierar-
chical function judgment, and this reasoning process, as illustrated in the previous
subsection, does not require any rules. It requires the establishment of the implication
relation,
P
=⇒, between two adjacent Hoare judgments of function nodes and the Hoare
abstraction of functions.
4.6.3.2 Partial and Total Correctness
The boundary of partial and total correctness in a traditional Hoare logic [25]
disappears in Lfn. There is no requirement for a termination proof. Terminating or
nonterminating code can be reasoned about in the same way without worrying about
termination at all. All that is necessary is to find the implication relation. This has
real-world applications, where many control loops in embedded systems are purposely
written to execute forever.
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4.6.3.3 Proving Safety Properties
Lfn does not directly encode a safety property itself. However, it supports making
a safety assertion at every state with the use of the parametric instruction semantics
throughout the logic. For a certain safety property of interest, a user can define a
customized instruction semantics which asserts the safety property, and then use it to
instantiate the semantic parameter. This means that the safety property is asserted
at every instruction of the program and hence for all states of a program. This is to be
described in detail when ARMor’s verification framework is presented in Chapter 6.
4.6.3.4 Hierarchical Reasoning
Lfn naturally divides a program into two types of proof units. The first kind of
proof units is a node with its predecessors, and it enables reasoning about a function
locally. The second kind is a function, and it reasons about the whole program
hierarchically. This feature is particularly useful in proving shallow safety properties,
because it allows to automate the entire verification process by leveraging whole-
program interprocedural abstract interpretation to find the specifications of functions.
Again, this is to be discussed in Chapter 6.
4.7 Soundness
The soundness proof for Lfn states that a program never gets stuck under a given
semantics throughout its execution. An informal argument is that when control
reaches the end of a code block, it resumes on one of its successor blocks (including
jumping to the entry block of another function) because of the implication relation.
Formally, a function specification FUN SPEC may be derived if and only if: starting
from its initial state s, if the execution reaches the label of a code block, L(n), then the
precondition defined by bspec on the block is ensured to be true. The corresponding
theorem is
∀ir s sq k n.
(seq ir C sq s) ∧ (bspec (bbl entry) s) ∧ (LABEL IN (L(n)) (sq k))
⇒ (bspec n) (sq k)
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where LABEL IN specifies that a state has a label, or the control reaches to the state:
LABEL IN l t iff ∃p. ((LP2SP(l, p)) t), and C is the set of code blocks of the function
and all its callees.
4.8 Discussion of Related Work
Hoare logic and its variations have been well studied, and Section 2.2.1 introduced
their development. Lfn is designed to address the issues inherent in a Hoare logic,
so that verification of safety properties of low-level or machine-code programs can be
effectively automated in a mechanized theorem prover. However, I did not discard
Hoare logic completely, because it is useful in certain situations. As described in this
chapter, the Hoare logic is used to reason about code blocks in Lfn, because code
blocks only have sequential control flow transfers, and this simple structure can be
reasoned about very efficiently by Hoare logic. At the program level, Hoare logic
describes a program by a Hoare triple, while Lfn describes a program by the top-level
function judgment. Concrete examples of program judgments are Theorems (1.1)
and (4.7).
Section 2.2.2 introduced CAP family of program logics. At a high level, Lfn
is similar to CAP in some sense: neither has complicated rule systems, and both
formalize Floyd’s inductive assertion idea. However, they also have important differ-
ences. CAP verifies a program specification one instruction at a time: it needs to
write down intermediate assertions for every instruction interactively, while Lfn uses
a Hoare logic to generate specifications for code blocks automatically. For shallow
safety properties such as the isolation properties verified by ARMor, the structure of
Lfn enables automatic generation of program specifications. In contrast, CAP related
work does not discuss how program specifications are effectively developed.
The development of Lfn is influenced by existing work. For example, Appel et al.
defined a safety property into a type system such that the type-safety of a program
implies the safety property of interest [5,6]. In supporting proof reuse, Myreen et al.
used a parametric instruction semantics in their architecture-independent Hoare logic
and instantiated the parameter with concrete instruction semantics of ARM, x86, and
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PowerPC [77]. Lfn uses a combination of these two: parameterizing the instruction
semantics as the bottom layer and defining a safety property in the semantics. A
concrete example is to be given in Section 6.2.
The top layer of Lfn formalizes Floyd’s inductive assertion. Floyd proposed
inductive assertion to verify programs in 1960s [33], and this idea has had extensive
and profound influence in verification communities. For example, VCG and PCC
both use it to discharge the conditions at certain program locations in program
verification [48, 54, 79, 109]. More recently, CAP family of techniques formalizes it
in a mechanized proof assistant and shows that it is possible to not use a Hoare-style
reasoning system in theorem proving [83, 113]. This idea has greater flexibility than
Hoare-style logics, such as reasoning about arbitrary control flow transfers and no
need for termination proof.
The function concept in Lfn is inspired by function summary, which has long
been used in interprocedural static analyses [26, 51, 112]. Traditional Hoare logics
develop function call rules to compose the judgment of a callee into the judgment of
a caller [75, 93]. In contrast, Lfn creates an abstract node for a callee in the caller,
and the semantics of this node is specified by a Hoare triple, which behaves similarly
to a Hoare judgment of a regular code block. There is no composition between the




ARMor verifies the memory safety and control flow integrity properties introduced
in Section 1.3. In order to carry out formal verification, these properties need to be
defined mathematically. This chapter gives formal definitions of the two properties.
5.1 Safety Properties Revisited
It is helpful to examine the characteristics of a safety property first. The memory
safety stated in Section 1.3 can be rephrased as:
for every instruction of a binary program, the set of addresses it writes to is a
subset of some given memory set.
This rephrasing reveals a fixed pattern about this type of safety property, and it
has two characteristics: (1) Every instruction of a program should have this property.
Because machine instructions are the minimum execution units observable from the
perspective of a program, this means that every state of the program should have
the property. (2) The property can be expressed as a predicate that involves some
attributes of an instruction. In this case, the attributes are the set of addresses an
instruction writes to, and the predicate is that this set is a subset of a given set.
The two characteristics ensure that memory safety can be defined for every state of
a program.
Control flow integrity can be rephrased as: for every instruction of a binary
program, the PC value it assigns to is one of its successor addresses specified in the
given CFG policy. The corresponding attribute is the PC value after an instruction
executes, and the corresponding predicate can be defined as a set membership test
on the attribute, if the successor addresses are represented by a set.
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The same pattern may be applied to other safety properties, such as memory
read safety: for every instruction of a program, the memory addresses it loads data
from is a subset of some given memory address set. However, for purposes of this
dissertation, I omit discussion of other safety properties.
5.2 Refinement of Memory Assertions
I augmented the existing ARM semantics introduced in Section 4.3 to make it
fit for verifying isolation properties required by ARMor. The augmentation includes
two major changes: refining memory assertions to reflect the introduction of the
control stack described in Section 3.2.2, and formulating the isolation properties
mathematically. The augmentation itself is proven as theorems in the HOL proof
assistant.
The general form of theorems of the augmented semantics is
{PC l ∗ R 8 k ∗ 〈l′ ∈ succ(l)〉 ∗ 〈MemorySafe〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ p}
(l, ins) (5.1)
{PC l′ ∗ R 8 k′ ∗ MEMORY dm df ′ ∗ MEMORY cm cf ′ ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ q}
where l is the value of the PC in the precondition, k is the value of the control stack
pointer, p and q represent other assertions that are not explicitly written out, and
corresponding values of machine resources in the postcondition are marked with a
prime ′.
The data memory of a program is divided into three parts and described by three
separate assertions in the augmented theorems. The three parts are the writable data
memory (WD), the control stack (CS), and the data pool (DP). WD includes the data
stack, the global data section, and the I/O addresses as depicted in Figure 3.5. WD
and CS form the given memory set mentioned in the memory safety policy described
in Section 5.1 and is denoted as mem in Section 1.7. They are preallocated in a system
configuration; the data pool is part of the code section of a program. Formally, they
are modeled as three sets of addresses: dm represents WD, cm represents CS, and
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pm represents DP. They must be disjoint in a system. Consequently, three separate
assertions are used to describe their contents: MEMORY dm df asserts dm, MEMORY cm cf
asserts cm, and MEMORY pm pf asserts pm. These memory assertions are explicitly
written out to utilize a feature provided by separation logic [90], namely, memory
addresses in dm, cm, and pm cannot appear in other machine resource assertions, and
doing so will result in a false value. Notice that the data pool values stay the same
in the pre- and postconditions as pf , indicating that the contents of the data pool
cannot be changed.
Figure 5.1 shows a concrete example of the augmented theorems for instruction
strb R1,[R2], whose original semantics is in Figure 4.2. In this example, only the
value of the writable memory set dm is updated to df ′ = ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) df ), while
the content of the control stack cm stays the same as in the precondition (cf ′ = cf ).
5.3 Formal Definitions
Besides the memory assertions, each augmented theorem has two important pure
assertions for the isolation properties. One is the assertion of control flow integrity:
l′ ∈ succ(l)
where l and l′ are the PC values before and after the execution of the instruction, and
succ(l) returns the set of successor addresses for a given instruction address. Note
that succ models the given CFG of a program by a function from address to address
set, whose type is word32 → word32 set. This assertion formalizes the predicate of
the control flow integrity discussed in Section 5.1.
{PC p ∗ R 8 k ∗ 〈(p+ 4) ∈ succ(p)〉 ∗ 〈{r2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1}
(p, 0xE5C21000) // strb R1,[R2]
{PC (p+ 4) ∗ R 8 k ∗ MEMORY dm ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) df ) ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗
MEMORY pm pf ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1}
Figure 5.1: The augmented theorem of strb R1,[R2]
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The other is the memory safety assertion denoted by 〈MemorySafe〉, whose com-
plete form is
MemorySafe = if (not (isStore ins)) then true else
ms(ins) ⊆ (if k = k′ then dm else cm)
where ms(ins) is the set of memory addresses that instruction ins writes to. The
rationale of (if k = k′ then dm else cm) is that if the control stack pointer does not
change during execution, then the instruction should write to dm; otherwise, it writes
to cm. This ensures that changes to the control stack can only be done through its
pointer. This assertion formalizes the predicate of the memory safety described in
Section 5.1.
In the example of Figure 5.1, the assertion of control flow integrity is
(p+ 4) ∈ succ(p), (5.2)
and the assertion of memory safety is
memok = if not (isStore 0xE5C21000) then true else
ms(0xE5C21000) ⊆ (if k = k′ then dm else cm),
where memok denotes the specific instance of memory safety for the store instruction,
which can be simplified to:
memok = ms(0xE5C21000) ⊆ dm
= {r2} ⊆ dm (5.3)
5.4 Proof Process
The augmented semantics is proven as theorems in the HOL system. The proof
process involves two major logic operations as well as SML programming. The first
logic operation is using the Frame rule of the existing Hoare logic to add missing
memory assertions [75].
The second one is using the DISCH rule of the metalogic to introduce a boolean
expression into the theorem obtained in the previous step and moving the expression
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into the precondition of the theorem with the SPEC MOVE COND rule of the
existing Hoare logic. These two rules are:
Assumptions ⊢ t
Assumptions− b ⊢ b⇒ t
DISCH
(b⇒ {P} C {Q}) = {P ∗ 〈b〉} C {Q}
SPEC MOVE COND.
In the next chapter, I will describe how the formal definitions of the two isolation





The framework of ARMor’s formal verification is developed based on the theory of
Lfn presented in Chapter 4. It aims to address two issues in verifying safety properties
of machine-code programs in a higher-order logic proof assistant: asserting the safety
properties for all states of a program and automating the entire verification process
including specification generation.
The middle layer of Lfn is a Hoare logic, and safety properties such as the isolation
properties introduced before are not directly amenable to Hoare-style reasoning,
because a Hoare judgment only has state assertions before and after the execution of
code without mentioning intermediate states, which is not sufficient in verifying safety
properties. Safety properties require that every state of a program must not violate
a given policy, which demands that every state of the program must have assertions
of these properties. For example, if used directly to reason about the control flow
integrity property discussed in Section 1.3, the Hoare judgment for a snippet of code
add R0,R0,#1; mov PC,R14 is
SPEC ORG INS {(p, R 0 r0 ∗ R 14 r14)}
(p, add R0,R0,#1) (6.1)
(p+ 4, mov PC,R14)
{(r14, R 0 (r0 + 1) ∗ R 14 r14)}.
It is not clear if the control flow integrity holds, no matter what value r14 takes.
Even worse, a piece of code may jump to illegal addresses and later jump back to
legal addresses, and it is impossible to use the composed Hoare judgment to argue
that the code violates the control flow integrity; conversely, it is also impossible to
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argue the opposite: the code does not violate the control flow integrity. Either way,
the Hoare judgment is insufficient.
The second issue is largely ignored by the formal verification community. Veri-
fication automation is traditionally thought of as a process of checking code imple-
mentation against its specification, and the specification is manually written [55]. For
example, some work simply assumes the existence of correct specifications and does
not discuss how they are developed [83,113]. I take a different position on this issue:
the entire verification process including both developing and verifying the specification
should be automated for checking shallow safety properties of machine-code programs,
because it is error-prone and inefficient to write specifications manually for such
low-level programs, if it is possible.
6.1 Overview
The bottom layer and the higher-order semantic parameter of Lfn provide a
mechanism that can be used to assert safety properties at every state of a program
explicitly. The basic idea is asserting the safety properties in an existing semantics
for every instruction, resulting in a customized semantic relation, which is used to
instantiate the semantic parameter. The customized semantic relation is created by
using the inductive relation definition introduced in Section 1.4.3, which guarantees
that every state in the customized semantics has assertions of the safety properties.
This in turn ensures that the instantiation of the semantic parameter by the cus-
tomized semantics brings about the desired result: reasoning about the program is
strictly based on the semantics that has asserted the safety properties at every state
of the program.
Assertions of the safety properties in the existing semantics are carried over by
the instantiation to the reasoning process of a program in Lfn. These assertions must
be discharged inside the program in order to meet the requirement of the program
judgment, which has the weakest initial condition of true, i.e., (λs. T) as discussed
in Section 4.6.1.5. In Lfn, these assertions are pure in the terminology of separation
logic. In order to emphasize their importance in verifying safety properties, I call
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them safety assertions in this dissertation. In this framework, safety assertions are
propagated and discharged by a whole-program interprocedural abstract interpreta-
tion, which automatically discovers the function specifications required by Lfn to
prove a program judgment.
At a high level, the framework operates in the following steps. The first step
is formulating safety properties as safety assertions in a customized instruction se-
mantics. This step is completed manually, because different safety properties have
different mathematical formulations. However, once the formulation is defined, it is
reused to verify the same properties of different programs. For example, ARMor only
formulates the two isolation properties once in Section 5.3, but automatically verifies
different sandboxed ARM executables.
The second step is instantiating the semantic parameter of Lfn, ir, with the
customized instruction semantics. This instantiation has a very important implication
in verifying the safeties properties: it guarantees that reasoning about a program is
based on the customized semantics that asserts the safety properties at every state
of the program.
The third step is discharging the safety assertions inside code blocks by using
Hoare reasoning provided by the middle layer of Lfn. Some safety assertions may
be discharged, and some may not. The undischarged safety assertions comprise part
of the precondition of code block judgments and are called safety assertions of code
blocks.
The fourth step is discharging the safety assertions of code blocks globally through
a whole-program interprocedural abstract interpretation. The result of the abstract
interpretation describes where the safety assertions of code blocks are discharged
along which call paths.
The fifth step is constructing function specifications based on the result of the
abstract interpretation and proving function judgments. It conducts necessary trans-
formations on code block judgments such that the required implication relation,
P
=⇒, defined in Section 4.6, holds between any two adjacent code blocks. Function
judgments are proven, and the judgment of the top-level function is the judgment of
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the program.
This chapter illustrates these steps except the third one by describing ARMor’s
verification in detail; the Hoare reasoning process used in the third step has been
described in Section 4.5.2.
6.2 Customized Instruction Semantics
The purpose of developing a customized instruction semantics is to integrate the
safety properties formalized in Chapter 5 into this verification framework.
The augmented semantics shown in Theorem (5.1) has the safety assertions needed
to verify the isolation properties, but it cannot be directly used in Lfn, because it
does not have the label predicate syntax required by the latter. In order to utilize
the augmented semantics, I use the inductive relation definition of the metalogic
described in Section 1.4.3 to define a customized semantic relation, SAFE INS, whose
instances can only be created by the single rule, SafeIns, which is defined in Figure 6.1.
The antecedent of the rule is Theorem (5.1), and the conclusion is the new semantic
relation.
The rule plays two very important roles in verifying the isolation properties.
First, it inherits the refined data memory assertions and isolation property assertions
described before. This means that every state of a program in Lfn has assertions of
the isolation properties, if a judgment has the semantic parameter SAFE INS. Second,
{PC l ∗ R 8 k ∗ 〈l′ ∈ succ(l)〉 ∗ 〈MemorySafe〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ p}
(l, ins)
{PC l′ ∗ R 8 k′ ∗ MEMORY dm df ′ ∗ MEMORY cm cf ′ ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ q}
SAFE INS (l, R 8 k ∗ 〈l′ ∈ succ(l)〉 ∗ 〈MemorySafe〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ p)
(l, ins)
(l′, R 8 k′ ∗ MEMORY dm df ′ ∗ MEMORY cm cf ′ ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ q)
SafeIns
Figure 6.1: Safe instruction rule
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the new semantic relation uses the label predicate syntax, so that the label component
of a state predicate can be easily decomposed and matched by the metalogic, while the
original separating conjunction operator (∗) does not have this convenient reasoning
power, because it is not a constructor.
Figure 6.2 shows an example of the customized semantics for instruction strb
R1,[R2], which is derived by applying the SafeIns rule to the augmented theorem in
Figure 5.1. It is worth pointing out that every axiom describing a state transition
in the existing semantics has a corresponding SAFE INS relation instance proven in
ARMor.
6.3 Instantiation with Customized Semantics
The second step of the framework is to instantiate the semantic parameter of Lfn
with the customized instruction semantics. In ARMor’s case, the instantiation results
in different judgments for different code units, and they are given in Table 6.1.
The presence of SAFE INS in the judgments indicates that the reasoning process
of ARMor is strictly based on the customized safe instruction semantics in which
SAFE INS (p, R 8 k ∗ 〈(p+ 4) ∈ succ(p)〉 ∗ 〈{r2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1)
(p, 0xE5C21000) // strb R1,[R2]
(p+ 4, R 8 k ∗ MEMORY dm ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) df ) ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗
MEMORY pm pf ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1)
Figure 6.2: Customized semantics of strb R1,[R2]
Table 6.1: Instantiated judgments
Judgment Safe Version
Code block judgment SPEC SAFE INS
Well-formed Hoare judgment WF SPEC SAFE INS
Well-formed node WF NODE SAFE INS
Function judgment FUN SPEC WF NODE SAFE INS
Program judgment PROG SPEC SAFE INS
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every instruction, and thus every state, has the assertions of the isolation properties.
When written out in a mathematical formula, the result of the judgment PROG SPEC
SAFE INS proven by ARMor’s verification is equivalent to the following:
Theorem 1 ∀i ∈ prog. (ms(i) ⊆ mem)∧(pc after(i) ∈ succ(address of(i))) with
respect to the initial state (λs. T).
where prog represents a program, and address of and pc after return the values of
PC before and after an instruction i executes, respectively, corresponding to l and l′
in Theorem (5.1). It reads as that for every instruction of the program, the memory
addresses it writes to are a subset of the given memory set, and the PC value after
the instruction is in the given set of successor addresses.
6.4 Safety Assertion Analysis
One of the central tasks of ARMor’s verification is to derive the two function
specifications bspec and kspec, such that the required implication relation between
adjacent code block pairs holds, namely, postconditions of the predecessors of a code
block imply the precondition of that code block. The implication relation is formally
specified as (kspec pre)
P
=⇒ (bspec node) in the definition of FUN SPEC in Figure 4.4.
The third step composes Hoare judgments of code blocks, and these judgments may
have safety assertions that cannot be discharged by the Hoare reasoning process
itself. These safety assertions present challenges to developing correct function spec-
ifications, because a safety assertion for a code block may require other code blocks
to be enhanced with some forms of the safety assertion. An example can illustrate
this issue best.
6.4.1 Challenges in Global Reasoning
The following is the resultant judgment for code block blk4 and blk5 of the example
shown in Figure 1.3(a) after the first three steps in this framework. For clarity
of presentation, I have used single variables with a prime such as c′ to represent
some uninteresting values of status flags in the postcondition; relevant values to this
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illustration are written out explicitly such as the value for zero flag sZ. The values of
status flags in the postcondition are set by the test equality instruction teq.
The Hoare judgments of blk4 are
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 6= 0x0〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk4 (6.2)
{(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0))}
and
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 = 0x0〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk4 (6.3)
{(0x2C, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0))}.
The Hoare judgment of blk5 is
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x2C, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf )}
blk5 (6.4)
{(rf R14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf )}.
The symbolic labels or values of PC have been instantiated to the concrete ad-
dresses of corresponding instructions. Each judgment has undischarged safety asser-
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tions: Judgments 6.2 and 6.3 have a memory safety assertion: 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉, and
Judgment 6.4 has a control flow integrity assertion: 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉. The
control flow integrity assertions of the instructions in blk4 have been simplified to
true, namely, been discharged. Discharged is also the memory safety assertion of the
instruction in blk5.
In order to prove the implication relation between blk4 and blk5, we need to show
that the postcondition of Judgment 6.3 implies the precondition of Judgment 6.4,
because they have the same label. However, this is not true for the current results.
The only way to make it true is to strengthen the postcondition of Judgment 6.3 to
include the term 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉, so that the strengthened postcondition can
imply the control flow integrity assertion of Judgment 6.4. However, there is not a
strengthening rule for postconditions, only the Weaken rule as shown in Figure 4.3.
An inspiring question is what changes can be made to Judgment 6.3, if we want its
postcondition to imply the safety assertion term? A solution is to use the Frame rule
to add the pure assertion to both the pre- and postcondition of Judgment 6.3. This
results in the following judgment:
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 = 0x0〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
blk4 (6.5)
{(0x2C, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0) ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}.
Now, we can prove that the postcondition of Judgment 6.5 implies the precondition
of Judgment 6.4. Both Judgments 6.3 and 6.5 are valid Hoare judgments for blk4,
but only Judgment 6.5 is the desired one, because it enables a successful proof.
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However, a new but similar question arises for discharging the safety assertions
of blk4, which had only one memory assertion before, but now have an additional
control flow integrity assertion. Imagine a program whose safety assertions scatter in
code blocks of different functions; the question becomes how to develop the desired
judgments for each code block efficiently. The fundamental reason causing this issue
is that Hoare reasoning is local and does not have the required global information.
In theory, we can repeat the above reasoning process for blk3 and blk4 to dis-
charge the safety assertions of blk4; this chain of reasoning can continue until some
point where the safety assertions can be discharged. For example, when 〈rf R14 ∈
succ(0x2C)〉 is framed to the judgment of blk3, its propagation stops, because the
postcondition of blk1 can imply it. The call instruction bl at the end of blk1 places
the return address 0x10 into the link register R14, and this address value is indeed
in the set returned from succ(0x2C), which is part of the safety policy given in
Figure 1.3(b).
Obviously, this process cannot be done efficiently by human effort for a machine-
code program. Fortunately, it may be conducted automatically by leveraging the
general framework of a whole-program interprocedural abstract interpretation. I
will describe this proof analysis as much as possible in the terminologies of abstract
interpretation with differences pointed out.
The central question that the analysis answers, as illustrated in the above example,
is what new judgments should be developed for a code block in order to prove the
implication relation between the judgments of the code block and the judgments of
the successors of the code block. When the original judgments of code blocks, as the
results of the Hoare reasoning, are viewed as nodes similar to program statements, the
analysis may be modeled as a fix point computation. From this perspective, the cen-
tral question can be divided into two subquestions: (1) What safety assertions should
come out of the precondition of a node when its postcondition needs to discharge a
given safety assertion which comes from the successor nodes of the current node. The
answer can be none, which means that the postcondition of the node can discharge
the given safety assertion. (2) What transformations should be applied to a node, if
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the postcondition of the node cannot discharge the assertion. The first subquestion
facilitates describing the analysis in the framework of abstract interpretation: the
analysis reaches its fix point when there are no new safety assertions coming out of
the preconditions of nodes. The second subquestion makes the analysis differ from
a traditional abstract interpretation: the latter does not change a node—a program
statement, while this analysis not only keeps the original node which is a judgment,
but also provides enough information about how to derive new judgments for different
call paths. In the framework of abstract interpretation, the computation for answering
both questions can be described in the transfer functions of the analysis.
6.4.2 Abstract Domain
The domain of the analysis is the power set of all concrete safety assertions of code
block judgments. The join operation is the set union, the meet operation is the set
intersect, and the weaker-than relation is the set subset. A merge operation means
the join operation on more than two sets.
6.4.3 Transfer Functions
There are two transfer functions in this abstract interpretation: one for code
blocks, and the other for function calls. They compute an outgoing abstract state
based on an incoming abstract state. An abstract state is also called a configuration,
and the outgoing and incoming configurations are referred to as out-configuration
and in-configuration, respectively. Each safety assertion in a configuration has some
attributes, one of which is called previousLabels; it includes the label of the code
block from which the assertion directly comes from, namely, the address of one of
the successor code blocks that passes the assertion to the current code block. In the
join operation, if two identical assertions come from two different successors, the new
configuration only contains a single assertion, but its previousLabels attribute is
updated to include the labels of both successors.
The two transfer functions work differently. This subsection describes the transfer
function for code blocks, and the next describes the other transfer function.
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6.4.3.1 Transfer Function for Code Block Nodes
The code block transfer function works as follows. For each safety assertion in the
in-configuration, it tries to discharge the assertion from the label predicate entries that
are in the postcondition of the node and that share some common label included in the
previousLabels attribute of the assertion. If the discharging attempt is successful,
it records the theorem that discharges the assertion in the list of discharged assertions
for the node. Otherwise, it computes what transformations should be applied to the
current node and what the new judgments are. Figure 6.3 gives its pseudo-code,
where bnode is the current code block node, and Σin and Σout are the in- and out-
configurations over all nodes inside a function, respectively.
6.4.3.1.1 Discharging methods. One of the central operations of the trans-
fer function is to discharge a safety assertion. ARMor attempts to complete it by
two methods. The first one applies the machine state at a postcondition entry to
derive the safety assertion. Its implementation involves two major steps. The first
step is to instantiate the free variables of the assertion with corresponding values of
machine resources at the postcondition entry. The second step is trying to simplify
the instantiated assertion to true by using simplification tactics, rules, and simpset
of the metalogic. An example of using this method is the discharging of the control
flow integrity assertion 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 of blk3 by the postcondition of blk1
discussed above.
transfer block (bnode, Σin, Σout):
foreach (assert, previousLabels) in Σin
foreach (l′, p) in postcondition(bnode)
if (not (l′ in previousLabels)) continue;
if ((l′, p) discharges assert) then
store discharging theorems and the current call path;
else
previousLabels = {L(bnode)};
Σout(bnode) = Σout(bnode) ∪ {(assert, previousLabels)};
store transformation information and the current call path;
return Σout;
Figure 6.3: Code block transfer function
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The second method is used if the first one fails. It frames a branch condition of a
judgment onto the judgment itself to strengthen the postcondition of the judgment.
For example, the Hoare judgment of the jump branch of blk3 is
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉 ∗ 〈rf R2 6= 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk3 (6.6)
{(rf R14, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000))}.
When it is framed with its branch condition 〈rf R2 6= 0x40000000〉, we get the
following judgment with a postcondition strengthened with the branch condition:
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉 ∗ 〈rf R2 6= 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk3 (6.7)
{(rf R14, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
〈rf R2 6= 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000))}.
The precondition does not change, because the branch condition term is pure, and
for a pure assertion 〈c〉, we have 〈c〉 ∗ 〈c〉 = 〈c〉.
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Similarly, we can strengthen the postcondition of the judgment of the fall through
branch of blk3, and the original and the resultant judgments are:
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk3 (6.8)
{(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000))}
and
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk3 (6.9)
{(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000))}.
With the strengthening by the branch condition, the postcondition of Judgment 6.9
is sufficient to discharge the memory safety assertion of blk4 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉, after
dm is instantiated by its real value given in the safety policy of Figure 1.3(b). In this
simplified example, dm = mem.
The second method is heuristic in nature, hoping that the enhanced postcondition
might be useful. It is desirable to conduct this heuristic enhancement even if the
condition is not used, because there is a Weaken rule for Hoare triples, as shown in
Figure 4.3, which can always weaken the enhanced postcondition to its original form.
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When either of the two methods succeeds, ARMor records the simplification
theorems for the current call path. Otherwise, ARMor concludes that the safety
assertion is unable to be discharged by the current node and begins a transformation
process.
6.4.3.1.2 Judgment transformation. The motivation for the judgment trans-
formation of a node is that when given a safety assertion which cannot be discharged
by the postcondition of the node, some changes must be made on the node such
that the postcondition can discharge the safety assertion. In the context of theorem
proving, these changes must be proven correct as theorems. The basic method that
ARMor uses for transformation is to use the Frame rule to add the safety assertion
into the judgment of the node while maintaining the consistency of derived judgments.
Denote a postcondition entry of a node as (l, p), and let t be a safety assertion
term whose previousLabels attribute contains l. The algorithm for judgment trans-
formation works as follows:
1. Instantiate t with the state of (l, p) to obtain a new term t′.
2. Apply the Frame rule to add t′ into the current node judgment.
3. Simplify t′ in the precondition of the current node, and denote the result as t′pre,
while keeping t′ as it is in the postcondition; this simplification process proves
an equality t′ = t′pre.
4. t′pre is the outgoing term for the safety assertion t, whose previousLabels
attribute is updated to include the label of the current node with label l
removed.
5. Record term t and the simplification theorem t′ = t′pre for the current path.
There are several important implementation choices related to this algorithm, and
I discuss some of the important ones.
6.4.3.1.3 Delayed transformation. The actual transformation of a node by
applying the Frame rule in the 2nd step is not carried out in this stage of computation,
i.e., in the abstract interpretation described here. It is postponed to the last stage
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outlined in Section 6.1 and to be described in Section 6.5, for two reasons. First, it can
reduce the number of proof transformations. When terms t1 and t2 are propagated




, then the same proof process will be repeated twice. When this computation





Second, the “current node judgment” mentioned in Step 2 is the original Hoare
judgment of a code block which has not gone through any transformations. This is
very important to maintain the correctness of the transformation, because terms from
different paths cannot be mixed together. An example illustrates this point. Suppose
there is a function add, whose C code is as follows.
int add(int x, int y) {
return x + y;
}
The ARM assembly code for the function is add R0,R0,R1; mov PC,R14, whose
Hoare judgment is
SPEC SAFE INS
{(p, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(p+ 4)〉)}
(p, add R0,R0,R1) (6.10)
(p+ 4, mov PC,R14)
{(rf R14, R 8 k ∗ REG ((rf R0 7→ (rf R0 + rf R1)) rf ) ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf )}.
Assume that the function is called on two different paths. On one path, a safety
assertion 〈rf R2 > 10〉 is to be discharged, and on the other path, an incompatible
safety assertion 〈rf R2 = 0〉 needs to be discharged. If a transformation was done for
the two assertion terms together, then the outgoing term from this judgment would
have 〈rf R2 > 10〉 ∗ 〈rf R2 = 0〉, which is false. This results in a trivially true
Hoare judgment, and the proof goes the wrong way.
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For a correct proof solution, each path requires a unique judgment: the first one
only needs 〈rf R2 > 10〉 to be framed on Judgment 6.10, and the second one only
requires 〈rf R2 = 0〉 to be framed on Judgment 6.10, bringing a different judgment
to each path.
The delayed transformation records all safety assertions along different paths until
reaching a fix point, and those assertions belonging to the same path are framed to
the original judgment of a code block to form a new judgment along the path.
6.4.3.1.4 Assertion cache. ARMor uses a cache to record what terms have
been seen at a code block and what paths the term belongs to. On the second visit
of the same term along a different path, ARMor only updates the paths of the term
in the cache without recomputing the discharging process. When this code block
level cache is combined with the function level cache, which is to be discussed later
in Section 6.4.3.2.2, ARMor only processes a unique safety assertion term once.
6.4.3.2 Transfer Function for Call Nodes
As in an interprocedural abstract interpretation, a function call is modeled by a
call node. What is different from a normal abstract interpretation used in a compiler
or analyzer is that all reasoning processes must be proven as theorems in the HOL
proof assistant. The definition of function judgment presented in Section 4.6 is based
on the relationship among judgments of code blocks inside the function, and it is
the only method available in Lfn to reason about a function. Therefore, the transfer
function for a call must follow the logic in the definition.
A call node is an abstraction of a callee, and a discharging process must be carried
out by the underlying function. The transfer function on the call node works as
follows, when the node receives a safety assertion term t to discharge.
1. Set up a new fix point computation environment for the callee, such as initializ-
ing the in- and out- configurations of all nodes of the callee properly; additional,
merge t into the in-configurations of all exit nodes of the callee.
2. Conduct a fix point computation on the configurations of the callee: the transfer
function for code block nodes is described in Section 6.4.3.1, and the transfer
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function of a call node is described here.
3. If the computation reaches a fix point, then the out-configuration of the entry
node of the callee is taken as the outgoing term t′ for the call node; the
previousLabels attribute is updated to the label of the entry node.
4. There might be no term coming out of the entry node, which means that term
t is discharged by some node of the callee.
5. If the computation cannot reach a fix point, then report a proof failure.
There are some implementation choices related to this algorithm to reduce redun-
dant computation.
6.4.3.2.1 Configuration initialization. A callee may have safety assertions
on its own code blocks. These assertions are initialized in the outgoing configuration
when the callee function is visited for the first time. Later invocations skip the
same computation on those assertions, and only the incoming safety assertions are
propagated.
6.4.3.2.2 Function level assertion cache. Similar to the assertion caches
used by the transfer function of code blocks, caches are also used for call nodes. For
example, before the actual fix point computation is performed for a function, its cache
is queried to see if t has been computed before and what its corresponding outgoing
term t′ is. In addition, the cache records call paths for all incoming terms. When
ARMor sees the same term later, it simply updates the paths of the term at this
cache, and the information for a term transformation along a path at a code block
can be obtained by querying both the code block level cache and the function level
cache. Because of the two caches, a safety assertion is computed only once for its
transformation at a code block.
6.4.3.2.3 Failure detection. The computation may not reach a fix point for
various reasons. For example, if the rewriting process used for discharging safety
assertions converts a safety assertion to a new form every time, then the computation
may continue for ever. ARMor currently uses the path that a term traverse to detect
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this situation: if the term passes the same code block multiple times, then ARMor
reports a proof failure.
6.5 Proving Function Specifications
The last step of the framework is to construct specifications of functions and to
prove function judgments. Recall that the fix point computation in the previous step
has recorded two pieces of information: the instantiated safety assertion terms to be
framed onto the judgment of a code block along different call paths, and the equality
theorems for simplifying the terms in preconditions. This step traverses through the
call graph of the program, and for each function along a call path, it performs the
following tasks:
1. For each code block node of the function, it conducts these steps:
(a) Frame the safety assertion terms that belong to the call path to the
judgment of the code block.
(b) Use the equality theorems corresponding to the framed terms to simplify
them in the precondition of the judgment.
(c) Prove the framed judgment as a well-formed judgment by the definition
presented in Section 4.5.3.
(d) Apply the Base rule defined in Figure 4.4(b) to prove the well-formed
judgment as a well-formed node.
2. For each call node, it conducts these steps:
(a) Prove the function specification of the callee corresponding to the call node
along the call path.
(b) Use the Induction rule defined in Figure 4.4(b) to develop a well-formed
node for the callee and use it in reasoning about the caller function.
3. Prove the implication relation,
P
=⇒, between two adjacent well-formed nodes; this
is successful now, because the safety assertions of the nodes can be discharged
by postconditions of its predecessor blocks with the recorded theorems.
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4. Take the precondition of the entry node of the function as the initial condition,
and take the union of postconditions of all exit nodes of the function as the exit
condition.
5. Prove the FUN SPEC SAFE INS judgment of the function by the definition pre-
sented in Figure 4.4(a). This process reuses the discharging theorems stored by
the transfer functions described in the previous subsection.
When applied to the top-level function of a program, this algorithm computes the
judgment of the top-level function. By applying the judgment definition discussed
in Figure 4.4(c), the program judgment can be finally proven. A proven program
judgment guarantees that the program respects the memory safety and control flow
integrity specifications formalized in Section 5.3.
6.6 Proof Engineering
There are practical considerations in implementing ARMor’s verification frame-
work in the HOL system. I discuss few important ones in this subsection, because
it is not possible to develop a working ARMor toolchain without addressing them
properly.
6.6.1 Avoiding Term Size Explosion
The middle layer of Lfn is a Hoare logic. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Hoare
logic composes judgments of bigger pieces of code from judgments of smaller pieces of
code. This causes problems in the HOL proof assistant, when the size of basic blocks
goes large. For example, if a basic block has 30 instructions including several store
and load instructions, then the term describing the value of memory at the end of the
basic block may go over 50,000 lines, which makes inspecting a judgment impossible.
During ARMor’s development, it was not uncommon for the proof assistant to hang
when a large term was produced; the only way to get out of this situation was killing
the HOL process and starting over.
A method commonly used in the HOL community is introducing unique interme-
diate variables for large terms. A single variable tv is made equal to a large term
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tlarge, i.e., tv = tlarge, and in subsequent rewriting processes, the single variable tv is
used at every place where tlarge is needed. The equality theorem tv = tlarge may be
placed in the assumption list of a theorem as an assumption.
This method does not work for ARMor’s verification. In order to prove a
P
=⇒
relation between a pair of corresponding postcondition and precondition, ARMor
needs to hide the values of machine resources by using SEP HIDE in the existing ARM
semantics. Because free variables are introduced at the precondition of judgments, it
is possible to derive the implication relation only after values in both the postcondition
and the precondition are hidden. If the values of machine resources cannot be hidden,
it is impossible to deduce the implication relation. Hiding values in the postcondition
may be done through the Weaken rule, because an assertion with explicit values
always implies an assertion with corresponding hidden values. However, hiding values
in the precondition is more difficult, since the values must be universally quantified in
a judgment. Placing the equality theorem in the assumption list prevents the values
from being universally quantified, because the variables that were free now become
bound.
ARMor uses decomposition to overcome this problem. ARMor splits a big basic
block into several smaller basic blocks, and the terms at the postcondition of each basic
block are small enough so that the HOL proof assistant can handle them with ease.
Because size increases caused by different instructions vary, ARMor uses empirical
knowledge to choose splitting locations. A good candidate is after a store instruction,
because subsequent load instructions tend to duplicate the value set by a store.
Splitting after a store instruction introduces fresh free variables for memory value
in the next basic block, and duplicating free variables in the next basic block is not a
problem. Specifically, ARMor splits after store instructions in a big basic block, such
that a basic block contains at most two store instructions.
6.6.2 Avoiding Judgment Explosion
The conditional execution of the ARM ISA presents a potential danger in com-
posing a basic block that contains multiple conditional execution instructions. Due
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to the compositional nature of the middle layer of Lfn, each condition generates two
judgments, so if there are n conditional execution instructions in a block, there will
be 2n judgments, resulting in a large number of judgments for a single code block.
I solved this problem by splitting such a code block into multiple code blocks, such
that each block only has two or four conditional execution paths. The relationship
among the split code blocks is reasoned about at the top layer of Lfn, which does not
have this compositional issue.
6.6.3 Making Proof Units
In proving the function judgment FUN SPEC, it is possible to directly use its
definition to expand the term in the goal stack of HOL for a program with several
basic blocks, such as the example program shown in Figure 1.3. However, this method
does not scale to functions with many nodes. A direct rewriting with the definition
generates a large number of subgoals, because the definition has a universal quantifier
and multiple references of the same term. For a function with tens of nodes, the
number of subgoals and the sizes of subgoals are collectively huge enough to make
the goal stack of the proof assistant hang. The only way to get out of the hanging
situation is to kill the HOL process.
To solve this problem, I grouped a node with its predecessor nodes together to
form a proof unit. For each proof unit, a theorem is proven, which states that the
node is well-formed, and that the postconditions of its predecessor nodes imply the
precondition of the node; namely, this theorem corresponds to the last two lines
of the definition shown in Figure 4.4(a). For a function with n nodes, there are n
theorems. Then the collection of theorems are used as rewriting rules in expanding
the definition. This technique works well for ARMor’s verification. In practice, a list
of over a hundred nodes can be proven without problems.
6.7 Discussion of Related Work
Reasoning about machine-code programs automatically in a higher-order logic
proof assistant is challenging. At a high level, two conceptually separated processes
hinder proof automation: one is the development of specifications, and the other is
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proving implementation correct in terms of the specifications. Previous work has at-
tempted to automate or semiautomate the second process. For example, Myreen et al.
developed algorithms for decompiling assembly code with certain structures into logic
functions and automated their proof reuse technique [77]; Ni et al. semiautomated
the verification process performed in XCAP [83]; Li managed to automatically verify
the correctness of the compilation of ARM code produced by the VCL compiler [61].
However, developing specifications automatically has not been addressed ade-
quately. Nevertheless, this is very important for reasoning about machine-code pro-
grams, because they do not have high-level language structures which may facilitate
specification development. It is error-prone and inefficient to write specifications
manually. My work presented here is not trying to solve the general problem of
developing specifications for machine-code programs; instead, it focuses on a narrow
area of verifying certain safety properties. As discussed in Chapter 1, this specific
area may have impacts on designing multitasking embedded systems. This framework
not only automatically verifies ARM binary programs against their specifications, but
also automatically generates the specifications by leveraging abstract interpretation.
Abstract interpretation has been an intensively studied area on its own since
Cousot and Cousot’s pioneering paper in 1977 [22]. Utilizing it to generate safety
constraints has been done in some research; for example, Xu et al. used it to generate
type state constraints of binary programs and then applied the VCG method to
discharge those constraints [109]. Other research used it to assist theorem proving;
for example, Seo et al. utilized the result from an abstract interpretation to guide the
construction of Hoare logic proofs [96,97]. Their approach was approximate in nature
and generated much redundant information which needed to be removed manually. In
contrast, my framework tightly integrates proof analysis and abstract interpretation
together and utilizes them directly generate specifications and theorems that are
needed for later proof use. There is no redundant information to be removed.
The transfer function used in transforming a code block node is similar to the
computation of the weakest precondition to some extent. The weakest precondition
computation dates back to Dijkstra and King [24, 53]. It answers a similar question:
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what is the weakest precondition for a piece of code given a postcondition. However,
the weakest precondition computation in program verification does not change a
node, nor does it require reasoning processes to be proven as theorems. In contrast,
the precondition in ARMor’s verification must be computed by applying available
reasoning rules in a higher-order logic proof assistant, and whether the precondition




This chapter illustrates the abstract concepts described in previous chapters;
specifically, it shows the verification process of proving Theorem (1.1), which can
be conducted by the ARMor toolchain automatically. The theorem guarantees the
memory safety and control flow integrity of the example program shown in Figure 1.3.
This process follows the steps outlined in Section 6.1.
The first step is discussed in Section 6.2, and the result after this step is the
SAFE INS relation presented in Section 6.2. Note that there is an instance of the
relation for each state transition, proven based on the existing semantics.
The second step is described in Section 6.3, and the result after this step is the
judgments listed in Table 6.1. As discussed in that section, the instantiated judgments
ensure that every state of the program has assertions of the two isolation properties.
The third step is demonstrated in Section 4.5.2, and the result after this step is
Hoare judgments of code blocks. Because the Hoare judgments of blk3, blk4 and blk5
have been given in Judgments (6.6), (6.8), (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4), Judgments (7.1)
and (7.2) show the judgments of blk1 and blk2, respectively.
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x0, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf )}
blk1 (7.1)
{(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ′ ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf )}
rf ′ = ((R14 7→ 0x10) ((R0 7→ 0) ((R1 7→ 0) ((R13 7→ 0x41000000) rf ))))
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SPEC SAFE INS {(0x10, p)}
blk2 (7.2)
{(0x10, p)}
p = R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf
One minor derivation may be done on these Hoare judgments. It is straightforward
to use the Frame rule to add missing assertions to each judgment to make it global.
For example, Judgments (7.1) and (7.2) are framed with the assertions of the four
status flags so that they become global. I skip this proof and will assume the global
version of Hoare judgments in subsequent discussion.
The fourth step runs the abstract interpretation described in Section 6.4, and
the result is information about which safety assertions may be discharged at which
code blocks and what transformations should apply to different code blocks. For
this example, the analysis shows that the control flow integrity assertion 〈rf R14 ∈
succ(0x2C)〉 of code block blk5 should be framed onto the judgments of blk4 and blk3,
and that it can be discharged by blk1; the memory safety assertion 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉
of blk4 may be discharged by blk3. The detail is given in the same subsection.
The last step is constructing and proving function specifications by utilizing the
results of the abstract interpretation. For example, the two global specifications
bspecfoo and kspecfoo of function foo may be constructed as follows. First, we frame
the control flow integrity assertion 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 onto judgments of blk3
and blk4. The results are shown in Judgments (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5). Although
blk3 has two judgments, we only frame the judgment with the postcondition whose
label goes to blk4, because this judgment is the only predecessor of blk4, and the
other judgment is not. The judgment of blk4 from label 0x20 to 0x14 is not a direct
predecessor of blk5, but it is an indirect predecessor. As a result, it is also framed
with the assertion.
Two minor deduction steps are required here. The first one is to merge the
judgments of the same code block together to prove a single triple for each code
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SPEC SAFE INS {(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
blk3 (7.3)
{(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000) ∗
〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 = 0x0〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
blk4 (7.4)
{(0x2C, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0) ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
SPEC SAFE INS {(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 6= 0x0〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
blk4 (7.5)
{(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0) ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
block. This involves two inference rules. One is the Union rule as shown in Figure 4.3,
e.g., Judgments (7.4) and (7.5) may be unioned into one judgment for blk4, which
has two label predicates in the precondition and in the postcondition. The other
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is the LPMerge rules. The first LPMerge rule merges two label predicates in the
precondition of a triple. When it is applied on the unioned judgment of blk4, the
two branch conditions 〈rf R1 = 0x0〉 and 〈rf R1 6= 0x0〉 form a tautology, and
a single-entry multiple-exit triple is developed below. The second deduction is to
prove that these judgments are well-formed Hoare judgments by the definition given
in Section 4.5.3, which is very straightforward. I will directly use the well-formed
judgment relation WF SPEC.
WF SPEC SAFE INS
{(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈{rf R2} ⊆ dm〉 ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk4 (7.6)
{(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0) ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉),
(0x2C, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
MEMORY dm ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df ) ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0) ∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}.
Similarly, the two judgments of blk3 are merged together to form a single-entry
two-exit judgment, Theorem (7.7). Notice that before merging, the judgment of the
true or jump branch is framed with its own branch condition in its postcondition.
Next, we apply the Base rule of the well-formed node defined in Figure 4.4(b) to get
well-formed node judgments for blk3, blk4 and blk5. Because the preconditions and
postconditions of these judgments are identical to the well-formed Hoare judgments
shown above, I do not repeat them here. Instead, I use some notations. Let P3, P4,
and P5 be the preconditions of blk3, blk4 and blk5, respectively. Let Q3, Q4, and
Q5 be the postconditions of blk3, blk4 and blk5, respectively. What are different in
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WF SPEC SAFE INS
{(0x14, R 8 k ∗ REG rf ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c ∗ S sN n ∗ S sV v ∗ S sZ z)}
blk3 (7.7)
{(rf R14, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000) ∗
〈rf R2 6= 0x40000000〉),
(0x20, R 8 k ∗ REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf ) ∗
MEMORY dm df ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ MEMORY pm pf ∗
S sC c′ ∗ S sN n′ ∗ S sV v′ ∗ S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000) ∗
〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
the well-formed node judgments are that WF SPEC is replaced with WF NODE, and code
blocks blk3, blk4 and blk5 are substituted by abstract code (bbl 0x14), (bbl 0x20),
and (bbl 0x2C), respectively. As a result, the well-formed node judgments are:
WF NODE SAFE INS {P3} (bbl 0x14) {Q3} // for blk3
WF NODE SAFE INS {P4} (bbl 0x20) {Q4} // for blk4
WF NODE SAFE INS {P5} (bbl 0x2C) {Q5} // for blk5.
From the judgments of well-formed nodes, the parameter terms of function judg-
ment of foo can be constructed, and they are shown in Figure 7.1.
It is straightforward to plug these terms into the definition of function judgment
and prove the judgment, because the simplification and derivation theorems needed
to prove the
P
=⇒ relation between two adjacent nodes are stored at code blocks during
the execution of the proof analysis in the fourth step. The proven theorem is
FUN SPEC WF NODE SAFE INS progfoo entryfoo initfoo
exitsfoo predecessorfoo bspecfoo kspecfoo
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progfoo = {(bbl 0x14), (bbl 0x20), (bbl 0x2C)}
entryfoo = fst P3
initfoo = snd P3
exitsfoo = {(bbl 0x14, Q3), (bbl 0x2C, Q5)}
predecessorfoo = [(bbl 0x14) 7→ {(bbl 0x20)},
(bbl 0x20) 7→ {(bbl 0x14)},
(bbl 0x2C) 7→ {(bbl 0x20)}]
bspecfoo = [(bbl 0x14) 7→ P3, (bbl 0x20) 7→ P4, (bbl 0x2C) 7→ P5]
kspecfoo = [(bbl 0x14) 7→ Q3, (bbl 0x20) 7→ Q4, (bbl 0x2C) 7→ Q5],
where fst and snd returns the first and second element of a tuple, respectively.
Figure 7.1: Function specifications of foo
where WF NODE marks that every node in the function is well-formed, and SAFE INS
indicates that every state of the program has assertions of memory safety and control
flow integrity.
By applying the Induction rule defined in Figure 4.4(b) on the above theorem, a
well-formed node for function foo is developed:
WF NODE SAFE INS {P3} (fun 0x14) {Q3 ∪Q5}. (7.8)
This judgment looks just like a normal Hoare triple in syntax; interpreted by its
semantics defined in Figure 4.4 and the semantics of SAFE INS, it states that every
node in the function stored at address 0x14 is well-formed, that the precondition of a
node is implied by the postconditions of its predecessor nodes, that if the precondition
of P3 is satisfied, then postcondition of (Q3 ∪Q5) is also satisfied, and that under the
given precondition, the judgment guarantees the memory safety and the control flow
integrity at every state of the function.
The precondition P3 has an undischarged control flow integrity assertion 〈rf R14 ∈
succ(0x2C)〉 as shown in Judgment (7.7). It should be discharged in the caller of the
function.
After developing Judgment (7.8), there are three well-formed nodes to reason
about in the caller entryFun as shown in Figure 1.4(b). The local version of Hoare
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judgments of blk1 and blk2 is shown as Judgments (7.1) and (7.2). After they are
framed with missing assertions to become global, we repeat the fourth and the fifth
step of the framework for function entryFun, as we just did for function foo.
The abstract interpretation finds out that the postcondition of blk1, where R14
is 0x10, discharges the assertion 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉, because the given safety
policy in Figure 1.3(b) has succ(0x2C) = {0x10}. The derivation theorems are saved
at blk1 during the analysis.
After the analysis, the needed deductions discussed above are performed, such
as proving well-formed Hoare judgments of blk1 and blk2 and converting them to
well-formed nodes. For example, let P1 and P2 be the preconditions of the well-formed
nodes for blk1 and blk2, respectively; let Q1 and Q2 be the postconditions of the
well-formed nodes for blk1 and blk2, respectively. We can write P1 = {(0x0, (λs. T))},
if we focus on the predicate of state contents, not on the contents themselves. Then
the well-formed node judgments for blk1 and blk2 are
WF NODE SAFE INS {P1} (bbl 0x0) {Q1} // for blk1
WF NODE SAFE INS {P2} (bbl 0x10) {Q2} // for blk2.
Together with Judgment (7.8), they comprise the well-formed nodes of entryFun.
Let Pfoo = P3, and Qfoo = {Q3 ∪Q5}. The function specifications of entryFun can
be constructed and given in Figure 7.2.
Similarly, it is straightforward to prove the function judgment of entryFun as the
following theorem based on the result of the proof analysis.
FUN SPEC WF NODE SAFE INS progentryFun entryentryFun initentryFun
exitsentryFun predecessorentryFun bspecentryFun kspecentryFun
It says that every node in the function stored at address 0x0 is well-formed, that
the precondition of a node is implied by the postconditions of its predecessor nodes,
and that the judgment guarantees the memory safety and the control flow integrity
at every state of the function.
After proving the judgment for the top-level function, the last minor step to reach
Theorem (1.1) is to existentially quantify the exit condition exitsentryFun and the
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progentryFun = {(bbl 0x0), (fun 0x14), (bbl 0x10)}
entryentryFun = 0x0
initentryFun = (λs. T)
exitsentryFun = {(bbl 0x10, Q2)}
predecessorentryFun = [(bbl 0x0) 7→ {},
(fun 0x14) 7→ {(bbl 0x0)},
(bbl 0x10) 7→ {(fun 0x14), (bbl 0x10)}]
bspecentryFun = [(bbl 0x0) 7→ P1, (fun 0x14) 7→ Pfoo, (bbl 0x10) 7→ P2]
kspecentryFun = [(bbl 0x0) 7→ Q1, (bbl 0x14) 7→ Qfoo, (bbl 0x10) 7→ Q2].
Figure 7.2: Function specifications of entryFun
continuation specification kspecentryFun. It is easy to prove the following program
judgment by the definition given in Figure 4.4(c), and it is the final result presented
in Theorem (1.1).
PROG SPEC SAFE INS progentryFun entryentryFun predecessorentryFun bspecentryFun.
CHAPTER 8
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
I implemented the SFI mechanisms described in Chapter 3 in C using the Diablo
platform; Lfn and ARMor’s verification framework are implemented in the HOL
system: the definitions of Lfn and the formalization of the isolation properties are
defined in the metalogic, and the proof analysis and other algorithms are implemented
in SML, which is the programming environment of HOL. The C code is 2,500 lines
long, total HOL/SML code is 11,500 lines long. Among the HOL/SML code, only 58
lines are logic definitions and formalization of the isolation properties, about 800 lines
are scripts for proving inference rules and useful theorems, and the rest implements
abstract interpretation, proof of function judgments and other supporting libraries.
In addition, there are 850 lines of Perl scripts that automate testing for the SFI
implementation, extract the output of Diablo so that program text and data can be
input into the HOL system.
Although C code and SML code are developed, neither of them is trusted. What
is trusted is the formal definitions in the metalogic; ARMor’s reasoning process is
guaranteed by the proof assistant in the form of theorems. If there are errors in the
SFI implementation or in the abstract interpretation, proving a function judgment will
fail. The purpose of the SFI implementation is to provide necessary invariants that
make the proof succeed; without it or with a buggy implementation, the proof will
simply fail. The purpose of the abstract interpretation is to automate the discovery of
the function specifications that define the function judgment; without it, depending
on human efforts to find global invariants in machine code is daunting and very
inefficient, if possible.
I applied ARMor to automatically prove the memory safety and control flow
integrity properties of ARM executables including my test programs and MiBench
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programs [44]. The proven MiBench programs are BitCount and StringSearch. Bit-
Count has 293 machine words in its code section, and StringSearch has 1104 machine
words in its code section. It took 2.5 hours to prove BitCount and 8 hours to prove
StringSearch on a 2.7 GHz Core i7 machine. These programs are compiled with GCC
3.3.2 with optimization level -Os and run on a development board based on a Philips
LPC2129 processor, which implements the ARM7TDMI architecture. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first time that realistic programs have been automatically
verified in a high-order logic proof assistant, providing the highest level guarantee
that can be achieved by today’s computer technologies.
8.1 Trusted Computing Base
The TCB provided by ARMor includes the formalization of isolation properties,
the definitions of Lfn, the formal semantics of ARM ISA, the HOL proof assistant
and hardware. Among them, I contributed the first two, whose definitions are 58
lines in HOL.
I compare ARMor with other work that uses sandboxing techniques to isolate un-
trusted binary code such as Gleipnir [1,28], PittSFIeld [66], and Native Client [95,111]
in Table 8.1. Some of the projects are quite big, and I only compare the sandboxing
parts in terms of the size of TCB and verification methods used.
The Gleipnir project developed CFI and XFI. For CFI, it performed theoretical
analysis at an assembly language level [2], describing formal semantics for a simplified
instruction set and for attack models, with final theorems establishing the correctness
of its mechanisms. However, this work was checked with human endeavor by pen and
paper, which means that any implementation must be trusted. XFI used a static
verifier to check the presence of CFI and memory guards. The verifier is a 3000-line
C++ program, which brings itself and a compiler into its TCB. PittSFIeld also used
a verifier, but as an improvement in verification, it formalized semantics in ACL2 for a
very small subset of instructions and for the verifier constraints; under the semantics
and constraints, it proved mechanically that its mechanisms could guarantee the
confinement of untrusted code [64]. NativeClient also relies on its verifier to ensure
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safety, and many testing efforts were made to ensure the correctness of the verifier.
Its verifier has 600 C statements for x86, and the sizes of verifiers for the ARM and
x86-64 architectures were not reported.
None of the previous projects has verified any realistic program at the binary
level. It is only ARMor that ensures formalized safety properties in binary code with
an automatic machine-checked proof, and this insurance is deeply rooted in a formal
realistic semantics of the ARM ISA.
8.2 Influence of Formalization
Formalizing safety properties and proving them for an executable expose a large
amount of information about the executable, which reveals useful knowledge about
verifying the properties and helps to correct errors in the SFI implementation.
8.2.1 Simplifying Proof
Initially, proving memory safety and control flow integrity was thought of as a
tricky process, because they mutually depend on each other: the memory safety needs
the control flow integrity to ensure that the store checks cannot be circumvented,
while the control flow integrity depends on the memory safety to guarantee that the
memory locations storing jump targets are not overwritten. In practice, introducing
the control stack and giving a smaller writable data memory set dm, which is discussed
in Section 5.2, are strong enough to prove the control flow integrity for most code cases
in ARM executables. For example, targets of switch jumps are stored in the datapool,
which is not included in the set of given writable addresses. As a result, after the
datapool memory is formalized as an independent and constant heap assertion, the
control flow integrity of switch statements can be proven. As another example, the
problem of overwriting return addresses is solved by introducing the control stack.
The solution of function pointers depends on how the pointers are used. If they are
not meant to be changed after being placed in a table, the addresses storing them may
be excluded from the given set of writable addresses, and they may be handled the
same way as for switch jumps. If the function pointers are allowed to be overwritten
with different values, a more complicated proof scheme is needed. So far, I have not
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considered this situation in ARMor’s implementation.
8.2.2 Locating Errors in SFI Implementation
ARMor is not designed to find bugs, but the failure of a proof reveals useful
information about possible issues in binary code. An example is that the link register,
R14, in the ARM ISA may be used as a scratch register in computation. My initial
implementation of the control stack only considered loading values into PC. As a
result, the control flow integrity assertion failed, when R14 was used as a scratch
register and later on loaded a return address. By looking at the values used in the
assertion and that of the R14, I found the reason of failure and considered instructions
that load a value into R14.
8.2.3 Removing Unnecessary Checks
Dynamic checks are inserted into an ARM executable to provide necessary in-
variants for verification. ARMor’s proof reveals that not all stores need checks. One
example is storing the control stack pointer, when there are not recursive functions
in a program, ARMor is able to prove the safe program judgment without adding
checks for the control stack pointer. This is the current implementation in ARMor’s
rewriting, given that most embedded programs do not use recursion.
8.3 Overhead of Safety Checks
I measured the performance overhead of ARMor’s SFI implementation for the
programs proven, and it ranges from 5% to 240%. For example, BitCount has
10% slowdown, and StringSearch has 240% slowdown. The high overhead is caused
by the address checking routine described in Section 3.2.1, because it is a rather
lengthy function with several load and comparison instructions. This suboptimal
implementation is used, because my research goal is to provide a very high-confidence
argument for strict memory safety and strict control flow integrity about binary code,
not to reduce overhead; this routine is the most direct way to implement a check. In
addition, the implementation is not optimized. If alternative SFI implementations
were used with less strict safety policies, the overhead would be reduced dramatically
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as illustrated in [105] and [95], but ARMor would verify a less stringent safety
requirement.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This dissertation has answered this question: what is the minimal TCB for an
isolation service based on SFI techniques for small multitasking embedded systems?
The TCB achieved by this dissertation includes just the formal definitions of isolation
properties, instruction semantics, program logic, and the proof assistant, besides
hardware. It does not include a compiler, an assembler, a verifier, a rewriter, or
an operating system. To the best of my knowledge, this is the smallest TCB that has
ever been shown for guaranteeing nontrivial properties of realistic binary programs.
This is achieved by combining SFI techniques and high-confidence formal verifi-
cation. An SFI implementation inserts dynamic checks before dangerous operations,
and these checks provide necessary invariants needed by the formal verification to
prove theorems about the isolation properties of ARM binary programs. The high-
confidence of the formal verification is built on two facts. First, the verification
is based on an existing realistic semantics of the ARM ISA that is independently
developed by Cambridge researchers. Second, the verification is conducted in a
higher-order mechanized proof assistant—the HOL theorem prover.
In addition, the entire verification process, including both specification generation
and specification verification, is completed automatically in the proof assistant. To
support proof automation, a novel program logic has been designed, and an automatic
reasoning framework for verifying shallow safety properties has been developed. The
program logic integrates Hoare-style reasoning and Floyd’s inductive assertion reason-
ing together in a small set of logic definitions, which overcome shortcomings of Hoare
logic and facilitate proof automation. All inference rules are proven based on the
instruction semantics and the logic definitions. The reasoning framework leverages
abstract interpretation to automatically find function specifications required by the
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program logic. All these techniques work in concert to create the smallest TCB
successfully.
9.1 Future Work
Using a high-order interactive proof assistant such as HOL has some fundamental
limitations in automatic proofs. First, there lacks support of effective decision proce-
dures. Proof automation must be done through tactics, and reasoning about program
facts can only be done through SML programming. Second, all deductions are
implemented by term rewriting, and rewriting in HOL is very costly in performance.
For example, in deciding if a safety assertion can be derived from the postcondition of
a node, it is not uncommon to take several seconds to obtain a success or failure result,
and the time amounts to hours for the entire analysis of a program. To addresses these
limitations, some research has been started to make proof automation easier in the
HOL system. For example, Fox integrated a SAT solver into the reasoning process
of word expressions [36]. Tjark and other researchers have worked on integrating
the Yices and Z3 SMT solvers into the HOL proof assistant [12, 57, 107]. The proof
assistant delegates constraints to an SMT solver and constructs a proof based on the
answer from the solver, so that automatic reasoning about constraints can be made
more effective. A future direction is to explore these features in ARMor’s verification.
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